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 This thesis contains an in-depth analysis of 84 recently completed Naval Facilities 
Engineering Command (NAVFAC) Military Construction (MILCON) projects.  It 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
 Every year billions of dollars are spent on building and maintaining United States’ 
military facilities all over the world.  The Department of Defense (DoD) owns and 
maintains over $500 billion worth of infrastructure across 40,000 square miles of land  
worldwide (Else, 2002).  The money used to maintain these facilities comes from 
American taxpayer’s pockets.  In fact, on October 13, 2004, the 108th Congress set aside 
$5.1 billion for Active and Reserve Military Construction projects to be used by 
September 30, 2009 (Military, 2004).  In order to ensure taxpayer’s money is being used 
appropriately, the United States Constitution states, “No Money shall be drawn from the 
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement 
and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published 
from time to time” (US Constitution, Article 1.9.7). 
 Unfortunately, the entire authorization and appropriation process takes years to 
accomplish.  Currently, Fiscal Year 2007 projects are being pulled together, planned, and 
budgeted for in preparation of their future presentation to Congress.  This presents a 
challenge due to the fact that needs change, projects get altered, and prices fluctuate on a 
highly unpredictable basis.  The money is allocated so far in advance, it makes one 
wonder how it is possible to formulate accurate budgets and cost estimates.   
 This research aims at evaluating the overall Military Construction (MILCON) 
process and its accuracy in projecting actual costs and suitability in preventing major cost 
overruns.  Chapter 1 explains the scope of this thesis.  Chapter 2 includes an extensive 
Military Construction project acquisition review as well as the cause for research and 
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objectives.  Chapter 3 explains the research methodology used, summary of all data, and 
an explanation of various anomalies identified within the data.  Chapter 4 is a discussion 
of the findings and perceptions.  Chapter 5 includes possible solutions, a summary of 
contributions, and ideas for future research.  
 
1.1 Thesis Scope 
 This thesis is an in-depth look at the most recently completed Naval Facilities 
Engineering Command (NAVFACENGCOM) Navy Military Construction (MCON) and 
Navy Reserve Military Construction (MCNR) projects.  All data were collected from 
Naval Facilities (NAVFAC) Headquarters and includes only Navy and Marine Corps 
projects within the United States.  Analyses were initially made regarding the trends in 
costs and estimates with respect to various cost indices.  Further separation of data and 
analyses were made with regard to geographic location and project type in order to better 
understand the findings.  The trends identified aid in determining the accuracy of the 
programming and estimating phases of the Navy’s MILCON process.   Additionally, the 
analyses help to discover reasons for variations from the norm and ways of improving the 
overall MILCON process for the entire Department of Defense. 
 Due to the sensitive nature of many military projects, the exact project name, 
number, and location will not be disclosed.  All project names and numbers have been 
modified.  The following data has been collected for 84 of the most recently completed 
MILCON projects and is listed in Appendix A.  
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1) Project Number:  Random number assigned to the project for identification 
purposes throughout this thesis. 
2) Appropriation Type:  MCON or MCNR. 
3) Fiscal Year (FY):  The year Congress appropriated the money for use.  
4) General Facility type:  Housing, Maintenance Facility, Operations Facility, 
Piers, Runway Projects, Security, Utilities, Property Control Facilities, and 
Various Other Base Amenities. 
5) Specific Facility Type: A more specific description of the project. 
6) Engineering Field Division (EFD):  Pacific, Atlantic, Southwest, or Southern.  
The Division responsible for the project. 
7) Programmed Amount (PA):  Total amount of money allotted by Congress for 
the project.  Includes 5% set aside for contingency, 6% for supervision, 
inspection and overhead (SIOH), as well as escalation and area cost 
adjustments.  The project cannot exceed 125% of the PA.  All costs over this 
amount must be justified and authorized by Congress. 
8) PA date:  Date Congress authorized the money for the MILCON project. 
9) Government Estimate (GE):  Estimated project cost done by in-house 
government engineers at the respective region headquarters.  Does not include 
any of the following:  5% contingency, 6% SIOH, follow-on contracts, 
Operation and Maintenance Support Information (OMSI), Certified Quality 
Manager (CQM), or Quality Assessment Program (QAP).  The GE is the 
government estimator’s best guess at what the low bid will be.  
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10) GE date:  Date the Government Estimate was completed. 
11) Award Current Working Estimate (ACWE):  Total amount of contract award 
including 6% Supervision, Inspection, and Overhead (SIOH), Post 
Construction Award Services (PCAS), OMSI, CQM/QAP, and selected 
follow-on contracts where necessary.  PCAS is defined as “Optional work 
generally performed by the architect-engineering firm that may include 
drawing review/approval, consultation during construction, preparation of 
record drawings, and construction inspection” (Department, 2003).  
12) ACWE date:  Date of contract award. 
13) Current Working Estimate (CWE):  Cumulative cost of the project to date.  In 
this case, all projects are completed.  Therefore, the CWE equals the final cost 
of the completed project. 
14) CWE date:  Date of project completion or Beneficiary Occupancy Date 
(BOD). 
 In order to better evaluate the data, similar information was collected for the last 
228 awarded MILCON projects.  This information is listed in Appendix B and includes 
the Project Number, Appropriation Type, Fiscal Year, General Facility Type, Specific 
Facility Type, Engineering Field Division, Programmed Amount, Award Current 
Working Estimate, and the Current Working Estimate.  In many cases, the projects are 
not yet complete and therefore the dates are not included and the Current Working 
Estimate does not necessarily represent the final cost of the projects.  
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 Chapter 2:  MILCON Acquisition 
 The following is a thorough review of the Military Construction project 
acquisition process.  The first section includes the history and reasoning for the creation 
of a separate monetary appropriation for MILCON.  Section 2.2 is a review of the current 
technologies used by the Navy for MILCON planning and estimating.  Section 2.3 is an 
overview of the current MILCON process used by the Navy.  Section 2.4 is a general 
explanation of the cause for research in this area.  And, Section 2.5 is a list of the 
objectives this study aims to accomplish. 
 
2.1 History of Military Construction 
 Military Construction (MILCON) projects are those totaling $750,000 or more 
and include construction of military infrastructure in the United States and overseas.  In 
particular, the MILCON appropriations bill “provides funding for (1) military 
construction projects in the United States and overseas; (2) military family housing 
operations and construction; (3) U.S. contributions to the NATO Security Investment 
Program; and (4) the bulk of base realignment and closure (BRAC) costs” (Else, 2002). 
 MILCON includes the acquisition of land and construction of ranges, demolition, 
built-in equipment, and supporting facilities.  [The] major categories [of MILCON] 
include (1) Operations and Training, (2) Quality of Life (Bachelor Enlisted Quarters 
(BEQs) and Community facilities), (3) Maintenance, and (4) Other (Supply and 
Administration).”  (Cost Element, Tab 14).  For the Navy, the money appropriated by 
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Congress is defined as MCON or MCNR.  Military Construction, Navy (MCON) is “a 
multiyear appropriation that funds the acquisition, construction, installation, and 
equipping of permanent and temporary public works, naval installations, and facilities for 
the Navy and Marine Corps.  Military Construction, Naval Reserve (MCNR) is “a 
multiyear appropriation that funds the construction, acquisition, expansion, rehabilitation 
or conversion of facilities for the training, and administration of the Reserve Components 
of the Navy and Marine Corps” (Cost Element, Tab 14).   
 Prior to 1959, military construction funding came from the annual defense and 
supplemental appropriations bills.  Fearing nuclear attack from the Soviet Union, 
Congress saw the need for a separate military construction appropriations.  The purpose 
of the bill was to ensure the proper build-up of missile silos, hardening of existing 
facilities, and construction of new infrastructure.  MILCON appropriations, unlike other 
funds appropriated by Congress, must be obligated within five years and are therefore 
called “multiyear” (Else, 2002). 
 In order to ensure the taxpayer’s money is spent appropriately, Congress created 
what is called “The Color of Money.”  This phrase represents the separation of money 
between Operations and Maintenance (O&M), Research, Development, Testing and 
Evaluation (RDT&E), Personnel, Military Construction (MILCON), and Procurement.  It 
means that money can only be spent on what it is allocated for and cannot “switch 
colors.”  This policy is also known as the Misappropriations Act (U.S. House, Title 31, 
§1301).  
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 In order to ensure the Navy never overspends its limits, the Anti-Deficiency Act 
was put in place.  It states that employees of the United States Government may not 
promise more money than is currently appropriated for the project.  The Anti-deficiency 
Act ensures sufficient funds are available at the time of project obligation and any time a 
change is made requiring additional money (U.S. House, Title 31, §1341, §1517).  
 Together, the Misappropriations and Anti-Deficiency acts provide checks and 
balances to the MILCON process.  Government estimators know they are limited in their 
design to the Programmed Amount.  Not only that, but they know they cannot get 
additional money from other areas of monetary allocation to cover additional expenses.   
 In order to receive MILCON appropriations from Congress, each branch of the 
military completes a DD FORM 1391 for all of their anticipated future construction 
needs.  Congress reviews the projects and allocates the funds as they see fit.  Until 1994, 
Congress “consistently granted significantly less budget authority to the Department of 
the Defense than had been requested by the [President’s] Administration (Else, 2002).  
Even with the increase in funding since 1995, there is never enough money to fulfill all 
project funding requests (Advisory, 2002).  Therefore, it is essential that each project is 
fully justified and documented to be considered competitive.  In order to justify the 
projects each branch of the military employs various technological systems and 
techniques.  Section 2.2 is includes a discussion of the current deficiency tracking, budget 




2.2 Current Technology 
 Large-scale attempts have been made to standardize the technology utilized by the 
United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), Naval Facilities (NAVFAC) 
Engineering Command, and the Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency (AFCESA).  
In 1992, the Tri-Service (Army, Navy, and Air Force) Automated Cost Engineering 
System (TRACES) was created with the intention of combining all military cost 
engineering systems and their associated databases into one location.  The TRACES 
agreement dictated which applications would be maintained by the respective services, 
thereby reducing redundancies.  Today, TRACES is fully accessible through a website 
requiring only a login password and is available to authorized users supporting the DoD.  
Appendix C includes a breakdown of the currently used applications on the TRACES 
website.   
 With respect to this thesis, the most important application on the TRACES 
website is the Historical Cost Analysis Generator (HAG).  The tri-services have 
successfully introduced the second version of HAG, called HII (pronounced H2).  The 
Historical Cost Analysis Generator allows the tri-services to forecast the cost of future 
construction needs using the historical award amounts of MILCON projects.  Since HII is 
completely web-based, DoD employees do not have to download it onto their computers.  
Instead, the data is updated on a real-time basis which means it is more accurate and 
timely. 
 Not only do the tri-services agree upon estimating software, tools, and references, 
they also use similar databases and techniques for tracking deficiencies, or mission 
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shortfalls requiring new MILCON projects.  From 2001 to 2003, the Navy used a 
program called Installation Readiness Reporting System (IRRS) from R&K Engineering.  
IRRS rated facilities based on a yearly list of submitted deficiencies.  Facilities with a C-
3 rating were considered as having serious deficiencies, while facilities with a C-4 rating 
were identified as unable to support the mission requirements.  IRRS allowed a big-
picture look at the facilities on each Navy base and a quick comparison of repair, 
replacement, and new construction costs.   
 Today, the Navy uses the Facility Readiness Evaluation System (FRES).  The 
program does essentially the same thing as IRRS.  It helps assess the current status of 
facilities and the installations as a whole using Navy-wide pre-set standards.  This system 
helps the Navy prioritize and allocate its resources where needed to ensure the mission of 
the Navy is met.  (R&K Engineering).  The Army and Air Force maintain similar 
databases with R&K Engineering to track their deficiencies.  This allows military 
installations to compete on a “level” basis for MILCON appropriations. 
 The technology used by the tri-services is continually being updated and modified 
to provide the most accurate information possible.  TRACES plays a large role in 
standardizing the tri-services and ensuring they all have similar resources available to 
plan and prepare for necessary MILCON projects.  This information provides legitimacy 
of this thesis towards making generalizations across the entire MILCON program and the 
respective military branches.  If each service performed their own type of planning and 
programming a valid association between them would be impractical. 
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2.3 Current Navy Practices – MTP3 
 The Navy currently uses the MCON Team Planning and Programming Process 
(MTP3) to prepare its MILCON projects.  The entire process takes years to complete.  
Table 2.1 is a step-by-step breakdown of the procedure:  
 
Table 2.1:  The MTP3 Process 
Deficiency Identification Identification of a deficiency, through FRES, or a future 
mission requirement the base will be unable to fulfill.  
The P-80, Facility Planning Criteria, can be used to 
estimate quantitative facility requirements for Navy and 
Marine Corps shore installations.  
Review Alternatives Identification and evaluation of the cost of all possible 
alternatives from:  repair/modernization of existing 
facilities, leasing off-base facilities, looking for existing 
facilities within the region, public-private venture (PPV), 
Unspecified Minor Construction (MC), or Military 
Construction (MILCON).  The P-442 NAVFAC 
Economic Analysis Handbook assists in the performance 
of economic analyses of facilities investment decisions 
and the consistent documentation of all projects requiring 
Congressional approval.  At this stage, the alternative 
with the lowest cost is chosen. 
Activity 1391 The command (called the “activity”) requesting the 
project, submits a DD FORM 1391 along with a National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) environmental 
checklist to the Navy Regional Command.  At this level, 
the end user requirement must be documented and 
justified.  A sample DD FORM 1391 is shown in Figure 
2.1.   
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Region Team 1391 The project scope is finalized and documentation is 
compiled so that it can compete with other projects at the 
Region level.  The DD1391 Package now includes the 
following:  A rough Plan of Action and Milestones 
(POA&M), environmental documentation, permits, 
delivery dates of equipment, a rough cost estimate based 
on DoD Guidance Unit Cost (GUC) data, all knowledge 
of the site, clean-up, NEPA mitigation, utilities, 
ECONPAK economic analysis report, Environmental 
Impact Statement (EIS), if necessary, and Environmental 
Assessments (EA), site approvals, site plan sketches, 
Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) Threat 
Analysis, preliminary hazards list, and collateral 
equipment list. 
EFD 1391 The EFD may use the SuccessEstimatorTM Parametric 
Cost Estimating Models (PCEM) or an A-E firm to 
create a 5% design effort.  Additional cost calculations 
are prepared using the Guidance Unit Costs (GUC) or the 
Historical Cost Analysis Generator (HAG) and taking 
into effect the area cost factor, size adjustment factor, 
and escalation.  The EFD is also responsible for the 
creation of a Budget Estimate Summary Sheet (BESS).  
This summary sheet is a breakdown of all cost associated 
with the project. 
NAVFAC Final 1391 At this stage NAVFAC collects, updates, and makes 
consistent with each other, all 1391 forms for projects 
still two years out from being authorized by Congress.  
Budget 1391 The 1391 is streamlined for authorization and 
appropriation. 
Design Authorization The EFD is given authorization to spend time and money 
on designing the project.  The Navy locks in the budget 
two to three years out.  Therefore, the Divisions know 
which projects they should be spending their time and 
effort on. 
Design/RFP The project team performs a Functional Analysis 
Concept Development (FACD) meeting composed of as 
many project participants as necessary to finalize any 
issues and reach a consensus.  The FACD meetings may 
sometimes last up to three weeks.  Following the FACD, 
the detailed government engineering estimate is created.  




Figure 2.1:  Sample DD Form1391 
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 The MTP3 process flowchart provides many opportunities to clarify the scope and 
make necessary changes.  It is important to note that once Congress approves the project 
and allocates the funds, the money can only be used for the exact project stated in the 
1391.  Changes can only be made if authorized by Congress.  For example:  If  the project 
1391 states the need for a 500-bed Bachelor Enlisted Quarters (BEQ) and the 
Government Estimate comes in lower than the Programmed Amount, the activity cannot 
add 50 more beds to the project to match the PA.  However, if there is an honest need for 
50 more beds and justified through Congress, the change can be made.   
 For Design/Bid/Build projects, if the Government Estimate is greater than the 
Programmed Amount, justification must be sent up the chain of command to authorize 
the advertisement of the work.  Congress must decide if there are sufficient funds to 
accommodate the request.  If denied, the command must reduce the scope to ensure it is 
within the set budget.  Many times, if there is a fear of exceeding the Programmed 
Amount, follow-on contracts, or bid options, are created.  The activity can then purchase 
a basic product and add any additional bid options up to their allowable budget.  This 
ensures the client is able to spend all of their allotted money without going over.  Upon 
receipt of bids, a meeting is set up with all parties.  The Government Estimate is revealed 
and compared to the bids.  Historically, the lowest responsible bidder is awarded the 
contract.  The determination of “responsible” is made after an analysis of the bid and the 
Government Estimate.   If the bid is higher or lower than the Government Estimate by 
10% or more, a thorough analysis is required to compare line items.  If the higher cost is 
justified by the contractor, the government must decide whether to accept the price or 
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reduce the scope.  If the higher cost is not justified by the contractor, the contract price is 
negotiated after discussions. 
 More recently, the focus has been on Design/Build.  In this case, a request for 
proposals (RFP) is made by the government.  Contractors wishing to bid on the project 
are given boundaries from which they are expected to come up with their best “solution,” 
or design.  They submit a very rough design and a bid for the work.  The government 
compares the designs and bids and chooses the contractor providing the best value.  The 
Design/Build process greatly decreases the amount of work for the government and is 
therefore being highly encouraged as an acquisition strategy. 
 The government has the ability to enforce the estimating systems used by 
contractors through the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA).  This agency helps to 
determine the adequacy of the contractor’s estimating systems and can, in extreme cases, 
disapprove their systems (Crow, 1996).  However, if the contractor’s estimating system is 
deemed adequate and the bids are all higher than the government estimate, MILCON 
projects are allowed to run over the Programmed Amount by a maximum of 25%.  
However, this practice is not highly regarded and is avoided at all costs.  If the project 
costs less than the Programmed Amount, the unused funds can be recaptured by Congress 
and reallocated to other MILCON projects requiring additional funds.   
 
2.4 Initial Summary of Findings 
 Initial visual evaluation of the NAVFAC MILCON data resulted in a “V shape 
with respect to the project life for most of the projects.  As shown in Figure 2.2, the 
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average of all 84 projects’ estimates and final costs form the shape of a lopsided “V.”  


















Figure 2.2:  Average Cost by Project Phase for the Last 84 Completed MILCON Projects 
 
 The following is a brief description of the “V” shown in Figure 2.2 and possible 
explanations for each leg.  Further evaluation of each section of the “V” shape will be 
made within Chapter 3.   
 The first leg of the “V” shows a slight rise from the Programmed Amount to the 
Government Estimate.  The most basic explanation for this is the fact that government 
estimators and engineers know exactly how much money they can afford to spend 
according to the Programmed Amount.  Therefore, the data seems to suggest that 
government estimators tend to estimate to the Programmed Amount instead of the actual 
project.  It is anticipated that the PA and the GE are essentially equal. 
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 The second leg of the “V” shows a sharp decrease from the Government Estimate 
to the Award Amount.  The data seems to suggest that the government estimators 
routinely estimate the projects too high, or the contractors underbid the jobs in an effort 
to get the work.  This phase seems to show the greatest room for improvement within the 
MILCON process. 
 The third and final leg of the “V” shape shows an increase from the award amount 
to the final cost of the project.  The data seems reasonable and suggests that the projects 
encountered change orders and unforeseen events during the construction phase.  It is 
anticipated that the percent change from the award amount to the final cost of the project 
is very close to 5% since that is the amount Congress allows for contingency.   
 According to these initial visual observations, the data follows a pattern forced by 
the workings of the overall MILCON process.  In the end, it is anticipated that the 
MILCON process reveals a “self-leveling” trend due to the fact that Congress has a set 
budget and must try to use it all.  If there is money left over on one project, it is shifted to 
another project.  This decreases the cost indices of the first project and therefore increases 
the cost indices of the second and balances out.  
 
2.5 Cause of Research   
 Military Construction projects are necessary to ensure the United States’ military 
facilities remain useful and productive.  However, most taxpayers want to ensure their 
money is being spent wisely.  The motivation for the author of this thesis is twofold.  As 
a taxpayer, the author wishes to explore the MILCON process in an effort to discover 
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ways of ensuring the government obtains a greater value in procurement of design and 
construction of its Military Construction projects.  And, as a military officer, the author 
wishes to find variances in the MILCON project data from the norm, reasons for the 
differences, and possible solutions to prevent the same inconsistencies in the future.   
 The system seems to work, but could it be improved?  For example, the system 
currently lacks any identifiable incentive for project teams to spend less than the 
Programmed Amount.  In fact, every incentive is provided to spend the entire amount 
allotted by Congress.  The bid options included in contracts may sometimes be 
unnecessary for the command to fulfill its mission objectives.  What incentives could be 
offered to the commands and the project teams to change these practices?   
 The system seems to mold each MILCON project into the observed “V” shape.  
However, there is still a lot of variance in the data.  What changes, if any, should be made 
to the MILCON process to force the project lifecycles into a more appealing and less 
variable shape?   
 Chapter 3 includes analyses of the MILCON project data in an effort to identify 
the significance of the project lifecycle trends noted previously.  Following the analyses, 
possible reasons for variations from the trends and possible solutions for mitigation are 
discussed throughout the remainder of this thesis.   
 
2.6 Objectives  
 There are several objectives this study aims to accomplish.  This thesis should 
identify trends in the Navy’s data, explain possible reasons for the trends, explain 
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possible reasons why projects may not always follow the trends, and recommend ways of 
improving the current MILCON practices.  More specifically, the goal of this thesis is to 
identify and explain the following with respect to Navy MILCON projects: 
1.) Trends in cost growth over the life-cycle of the projects. 
2.) General geographic locations that do not follow the normal life-cycle trends and 
possible reasons for their variation. 
3.) Types of projects that fall outside of the normal cost growth trends and possible 
reasons for their deviation from the norm.   
 Using the objectives listed above, an overall analysis of the Navy’s MILCON 
process can be made.  This analysis can help find ways of improving budgeting and 




Chapter 3:  Observations 
3.1 Methodology  
 All data used to analyze the MILCON process was obtained from NAVFAC 
Headquarters, NAVFAC Engineering Field Divisions (EFD), and a Navy project 
database called eProjects.  The first set of data includes information regarding 84 
completed NAVFAC MILCON projects.  All of the 84 projects listed were appropriated 
by Congress over a three-year period from 2001 through 2003.  The list only consists of 
projects within the United States and totals over $703.3 million in cost.  The spreadsheet 
program used for all calculations and data accumulation was Microsoft ExcelTM.   
 The original data from NAVFACHQ did not include the Government Estimates 
or the dates for the PA, GE, ACWE, or CWE.  Therefore, a significant amount of time 
was spent accumulating this data from the respective contracting offices and a NAVFAC 
database called eProjects.  The accumulated data is listed in Appendix A.  Once all data 
was collected, a few minor modifications needed to be made in order for the estimates 
and final costs to be comparable.  The project data sent from NAVFACHQ could not be 
sufficiently compared to each other due to inclusion/exclusion of contingency and SIOH 
amounts.  In order to make them comparable, the Programmed Amount was reduced by 
5% to exclude the contingency amount and the Government Estimate was increased by 
6% to include SIOH.  These changes ensured that the PA, GE, ACWE, and CWE all 
included the same markups and could therefore be compared without giving false trends.  
Following these adjustments, analyses were made.  Project information falling outside of 
the normal range was researched and all anomalies were analyzed, explained (where 
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possible), but not removed from the data.  By contacting the project manager or other 
project personnel, erratic costs and estimates could be explained.  However, in many 
cases the individuals involved were no longer available for interview or comments.   
 The second set of data is a list of 228 projects that have been awarded; however, 
some of the projects have not been completed.  Again, the original data from 
NAVFACHQ did not include the Government Estimates or the dates for the PA, GE, 
ACWE, or CWE.  In all, the projects total over $2 Billion, were appropriated by 
Congress from 2001 through 2004, and are all located within the United States.  The data 
is listed in Appendix B. This data also had to be manipulated in order to be comparable.  
Following the adjustments, analyses were made between the Programmed Amount and 
the award amount and compared to the first data sets’ information to see if the data found 
within the 84 projects truly represents the larger population of MILCON projects. 
 The general methodology used for this thesis is an evaluation of the Navy’s data 
on MILCON project costs.  This thesis regards the MILCON process as uniform across 
the tri-services due to Constitutional and Congressional restrictions.  Therefore, 
recommendations for improving the Navy’s MILCON process will also improve the 
other services’ MILCON processes.  Figure 3.1 is a flow chart of the methodology used 
for this thesis. 
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Focus on MILCON projects 
List necessary information and collect data 
Analyze data with visual and statistical analyses to identify trends 
Identify locations with trends outside of the norm 
Make conclusions and recommendations 
Identify reasons for locations and project types falling outside the 
norm using historical and technological research 
Identify project types with trends outside of the norm 
Discuss current issues with NAVFACHQ regarding all Navy projects 
 
Figure 3.1: Research methodology flowchart 
  
 The following is a list of indices and their respective formulas used in analyzing 
the data.  All formula names are made up except for Construction Cost Growth. 
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Planning Cost Growth:  The percent change in the planned cost of the project from the 
Programmed Amount (PA) to the Government Estimate (GE).  This is just one way of 
analyzing the Navy’s budgeting and estimating practices.  This index represents the first 




Programming Cost Growth:  The percent change in the planned cost of the project from 
the Programmed Amount (PA) to the Award Current Working Estimate (ACWE), or 
award amount.  This is the second of three ways to evaluate the Navy’s budgeting and 
estimating practices.  This index aids in determining the accuracy of the Navy’s long-
term programming databases such as the Historical Cost Analysis Generator (HII) since 
the award amount is the price entered into the HII database.   Additionally, this index can 
be used to compare the 84 completed MILCON projects to the entire data set of 228 
awarded MILCON projects. 
(ACWE – PA)*100 
PA 
 
Overall Cost Growth:  The percent change in the planned cost of the project from the 
Programmed Amount (PA) to the Current Working Estimate (CWE), or final cost of the 
project.  This is the third way of evaluating the Navy’s budgeting and estimating 
practices.  This index aids in determining the overall accuracy of the Programmed 
Amount since the goal of the PA is to project the actual cost, or CWE, of the project. 
(CWE – PA)*100 
PA 
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 Award Cost Growth:  The percent change in the cost of the project from the Government 
Estimate (GE) to the Award Current Working Estimate (ACWE), or award amount.  This 
is one of two ways of evaluating the Navy’s detailed cost estimating practices for 
MILCON projects.  This index represents the middle leg of the observed “V” shape in 
Figure 2.2.  This index aids in determining the difference between the government 
estimator’s estimate and the contractor’s estimate. 
(ACWE – GE)*100 
GE 
 
Final Cost Growth:  The percent change in the cost of the project from the Government 
Estimate (GE) to the Current Working Estimate (CWE), or final cost of the project.  This 
is the second way of evaluating the Navy’s detailed cost estimating practices for 
MILCON projects.  This index aids in determining the accuracy of the Government 
Estimate since the goal of the GE is to project the final cost, or CWE, of the project.   
(CWE – GE) *100 
GE 
 
Construction Cost Growth:  The percentage change in the cost of the project from the 
Award Current Working Estimate (ACWE), or award amount, to the Current Working 
Estimate (CWE), or final cost of the project.  This value, along with other project details 
and information helps in determining the extent of cost growth for MILCON projects.  
This index represents the third leg of the observed “V” shape in Figure 2.2. 
(CWE – ACWE)*100 
ACWE 
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 Using the six indices listed above, this thesis seeks to find the extent to which 
they are apparent in the MILCON project data.  The following sections include analysis 
of the indices and further evaluation of the indices in relation to the project geographic 
locations and project types.  
 Due to sampling size, many of the analyses made are only represented 
graphically.  Where there is enough data, statistical analysis was used in the form of a 
paired two sample for means t-test.  The objective of the hypothesis testing is to 
determine whether the means of the two samples are equal to each other at a certain level 
of significance.  By establishing the null hypothesis [Mean of sample 1 = Mean of sample 
2: ( 1X = 2X )] and alternate hypothesis [Mean of sample 1 ≠ Mean of sample 2: 
( 1X ≠ 2X ), it is possible calculate the t-test statistic and prove that the two samples are 
statistically similar and therefore come from the same parent population or not.  The level 
of significance used to prove or disprove the null hypothesis is 95%.  The Microsoft 
ExcelTM Data Analysis function was used to calculate the t-values.  The null hypothesis 
acceptance ranges at various levels of confidence for the t statistic are shown below: 
 99.9%:  t-value from -3.416 to 3.416 
 99.5%:  t-value from -2.887 to 2.887 
 99%:  t-value from -2.638 to 2.638 
 97.5%:  t-value from -2.284 to 2.284 
 95%:  t-value from -1.989 to 1.989 
 90%:  t-value from -1.665 to 1.665 
 80%:  t-value from -1.293 to 1.293 
 24
 3.2 Summary of Data  
 The following analyses were made in order to find trends in the data: 
1.)  Graphical and statistical analysis of the project cost growth indices. 
2.) Graphical analysis of the average project cost growth indices in relation to the 
geographic location.   
3.) Graphical analysis of the average project cost growth indices in relation to the 
type of project. 
 
3.2.1 Project Indices 
 The first analysis of the 84 MILCON projects’ data is done using the six project 
cost growth indices as described in Chapter 3.1.  The analysis of these indices is useful in 
determining the extent to which the data accumulated for the 84 projects is representative 
of all NAVFAC MILCON projects and hopefully all MILCON projects.  By identifying 
undeniable trends in the data, it may be possible to explain the trends or variances from 
the trends in an effort to better control them. 
 Two graphs are given for each project cost growth index.  The first graph is a plot 
of the frequency of each percent cost growth index value calculated.  This graph visually 
shows the average cost growth index and its associated variance.  The second graph is a 
plot of the percent cost growth as a function of the project cost.  It visually shows the cost 
growth trend for projects from $750,000 to $45,000,000. 
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3.2.3.1 Planning Cost Growth Index 
 The Planning Cost Growth Index represents the percent change from the PA to 
the GE.  Figure 3.2 shows an extremely high frequency of -1% to 1% Planning Cost 
Growth.  In fact, over 52% of the 84 projects fall within these limits.  The values of 
Planning Cost Growth vary from -46% to 39% with a mean of -0.12%, median of 0%, 
and mode of 1%.  The standard deviation of the sample is equal to 10%.  The data shows 












































Figure 3.2:  Frequency of Planning Cost Growth Indices 
 
 This information seems to suggest that either the Programmed Amount is very 
precise or the government estimators are trying to stay as close to the PA as possible.  
This fact is easily accounted for when compared to the workings of the MILCON system.  
Government estimators, as well as engineers, know exactly how much money they can 
afford to spend according to the PA.  In many cases, the original amount requested on the 
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1391 has been cut by Congress in an effort to take on more projects at one time.  The 
government estimators and engineers are therefore forced to use every cent in an effort to 
create the necessary project.  In many cases, the task just cannot be done and the 
Government Estimate is forced to exceed the Programmed Amount.  Most estimators try 
to stay within the budget in order to prevent the reorganization of money between 
projects or the need to request additional money from Congress.  The difficulties and 
time-consumption involved with requesting more money from Congress is a deterrent 
from increasing project costs and acts as a sort of cost control for all MILCON projects. 
 Figure 3.3 is a graph of the variation in the Planning Cost Growth Indices as a 
function of the PA, or planned cost of the project.  The graph also shows the best-fit line 
and the best-fit line equation for the data.  For Programmed Amounts from $750,000 to 
$45,000,000, the average Planning Cost Growth Index, according to the best-fit line 
equation, varies only from -0.4% to 2.6% respectively.  


























Figure 3.3:  Planning Cost Growth Index as a Function of the Programmed Amount 
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  The graph seems to suggest that there is less predictability in the Planning Cost 
Growth for less expensive projects.  The graph also shows a slight increase in the 
Planning Cost Growth for more costly projects.  However, this graph visually explains 
that no matter what the size of the MILCON project, the average Planning Cost Growth 
Index is expected to be near 0%.    In order to test this hypothesis, further statistical 
analysis is necessary. 
 Table 3.1 is a summary of the t-test statistical analysis performed on the Planning 
Cost Growth Index variables to test whether or not they are statistically similar.   
 
Table 3.1:  Summary of t-Test for Planning Cost Growth Input Variables 
  PA GE 
Mean 8788753 8857087 
Variance 8.3E+13 8.79E+13 
Observations 84 84 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
Df 83  
t Stat -1.02783   
 
 According to the analysis, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected with any 
significant confidence level.  Therefore, the null hypothesis must be accepted.  This 
means the PA and the GE are statistically similar and are therefore regarded as having the 
same mean and standard deviation and originating from the same parent population.  The 
t-test statistical analysis proves that the difference between the Programmed Amount and 




3.2.3.2 Programming Cost Growth Index 
 The Programming Cost Growth Index represents the percent change in the cost of 
the project from the PA to the ACWE, or award amount.  As previously stated in Section 
3.1, this index can be used to determine the accuracy of the Historical Analysis Generator 
(HII) database used in formulating the PA.  Figure 3.4 shows the frequencies of each 
Programming Cost Growth Index.  The values range from -47% to 26% with a mean of -
5%, median of -3%, and mode of 2%.  The sample standard deviation is equal to 15%.  

































Figure 3.4:  Frequency of Programming Cost Growth Indices 
 
 This data makes sense when compared to the workings of the MILCON system.  
Unlike the Government estimators, the contractors are unaware of the PA or the GE when 
preparing their bids.  Additionally, due to the time lapse of up to years between the PA 
date and the award date, changes may have occurred in the scope of work and the 
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expected prices of materials may be different.  Therefore, it is to be expected that these 
values would be less predictable than the Planning Cost Growth Indices.   
 Figure 3.5 is a graph of the variation in the Programming Cost Growth Indices as 
a function of the PA.  The graph also shows the least squares line and equation for the 
data.  For Programmed Amounts from $750,000 to $45,000,000, the average 
Programming Cost Growth Index varies from -2.8% to -15.9% respectively.  This graph 
suggests that there is more variability in the Programming Cost Growth of smaller 
projects.  This graph also shows that the higher priced projects had a larger percent 
decrease from the Programmed Amount to the award amount.  This could mean that the 
planners and the HII database overestimated the actual price of the projects.    




























Figure 3.5:  Programming Cost Growth Index as a Function of the Programmed Amount 
  
 Although the graphs suggest that this is true for the 84 projects analyzed within 
this thesis, further statistical analysis is necessary to test for the confidence level of this 
statement. 
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 Table 3.2 is a summary of the t-test statistical analysis performed on the 
Programming Cost Growth Index variables to test whether or not they are statistically 
similar.   
 
Table 3.2:  Summary of t-Test for Programming Cost Growth Input Variables with a 
Hypothesized Mean Difference Equal to 0% 
  PA ACWE 
Mean 8788753 8123333 
Variance 8.3E+13 6.95E+13 
Observations 84 84 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
Df 83  
t Stat 4.293493   
 
 According to the analysis, the null hypothesis must be rejected with a level of 
confidence equal to 99.9%.  The t-test proves that the means and the standard deviations 
of the PA and ACWE are not equal.  Therefore, they alternative hypothesis must be 
accepted, which is to say that there is a difference between the means of the two 
variables.  Figure 3.5 shows the difference graphically.  It displays how the Programming 
Cost Growth Index becomes smaller and smaller as the price of the project increases.   
 Additional analysis of the Programming Cost Growth Index can be made with 






Table 3.3:  Summary of t-test for Programming Cost Growth Indices Found in the 
Smaller and Larger Project Data Sets 
  Data Appendix A Data Appendix B 
Mean -0.049917917 -0.021619593 
Variance 0.022271827 0.042867817 
Observations 84 144 
Pooled Variance 0.035303803  
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
Df 226  
t Stat -1.09699192   
  
According to Table 3.3, the larger project set has an average Programming Cost 
Growth equal to -2.2%.  This closely matches the -3% median found in the 84-project 
data set.  Table 3.3 also proves that the Programming Cost Growth found within the 84 
projects is essentially the same as that of the larger MILCON project data set.  According 
to the analysis, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected with any significant confidence 
level.  Therefore, the null hypothesis must be accepted.  This means the two data sets are 
statistically similar and are therefore regarded as having the same mean and standard 
deviation and originating from the same parent population.  The t-test statistical analysis 
proves that a -2.2% Programming Cost Growth Index is typical for all MILCON projects. 
 
3.2.3.3 Overall Cost Growth Index  
 The Overall Cost Growth Index is the percent change in the price of the project 
from the PA to the CWE, or the final cost of the project.  This value helps to determine 
the accuracy of the planning estimate in forecasting the actual price of the completed 
construction project.  As shown in Figure 3.6, the Overall Cost Growth Index values 
ranged widely from -43% to 29% with a mean of -1.4% and a median of 0%.  There are 
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two values for the mode since -1% and 5% both have a frequency equal to 7.  The 
standard deviation of the sample is 16%.  Again, this data shows a very wide variance 

































Figure 3.6:  Frequency of Overall Cost Growth Indices 
 
 This data is expected to closely match the Programming Cost Growth Index.  The 
only changes between the Programming and Overall Cost Growth Indices are the changes 
made during the construction phase of the project.  Figure 3.7 is a graph of the variation 
in the Overall Cost Growth Indices as a function of the PA.  The graph also shows the 
best-fit line and the best-fit line equation for the data.  For Programmed Amounts from 
$750,000 to $45,000,000, the average Overall Cost Growth Index varies from 1.8% to -
16.2% respectively.  This graph shows that higher priced projects had a larger percent 
decrease from the Programmed Amount to the final cost of the project.  Again, this could 
mean that the planners and the HII database overestimated the actual price of the projects.   
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Figure 3.7:  Overall Cost Growth Index as a Function of the Programmed Amount 
 
 Although the graphs suggest that this is true for the 84 projects analyzed within 
this thesis, further statistical analysis is necessary to test for the confidence level of this 
statement. 
 Table 3.4 is a summary of the t-test statistical analysis performed on the Overall 
Cost Growth Index variables to test whether or not they are statistically similar.   
 
Table 3.4:  Summary of t-Test for the Overall Cost Growth Input Variables 
  PA CWE 
Mean 8788753 8373453 
Variance 8.3E+13 7.17E+13 
Observations 84 84 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
Df 83  
t Stat 2.641882   
 
 According to the analysis, the null hypothesis must be rejected with 99% 
confidence level.  Therefore, the alternate hypothesis must be accepted.  This means the 
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PA and the CWE are not statistically similar and are therefore regarded as having 
different values of mean and standard deviation.  The t-test statistical analysis proves that 
there is a difference between the Programmed Amount and the final cost of the project.  
Figure 3.7 graphically shows the decrease in the Overall Cost Growth Index as the prices 
of the projects increase. 
 
3.2.3.4 Award Cost Growth Index 
 The Award Cost Growth Index represents the percent change in the cost of the 
project from the GE to the ACWE, or award amount.  As previously stated in Section 3.1, 
this index can be used to compare the Navy’s detailed cost estimating systems with the 
contractor’s estimating practices.  Figure 3.8 shows the frequencies of each Award Cost 
Growth Index.  The values range from -43% to 36% with a mean of -4.9% and a median 
of -5%.  There are essentially 3 modes for this sample since -9%, 1%, and 2% all 
displayed a frequency of 5.  The standard deviation of the sample is equal to 14%.  The 
graph shows a very wide variance in the data and quite a few outliers.  
 Visual analysis of Figure 2.2 seems to suggest the greatest change in the lifecycle 
of the MILCON projects lies between the Government Estimate and the Award Amount.  
One very surprising fact is that nearly 87% of the MILCON projects analyzed were 
awarded for an amount less than 10% over the Government Estimate.  This means only 
13% of the projects required a detailed analysis to identify the differences in cost 
estimates.  Comparing the GE and the contractor’s bid can be a very time-consuming task 
especially when the government estimator and the contractor have used different 
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estimating systems.  Other factors that increase the time it takes to compare estimates 
include the detail of the line items and the size of the project.  Therefore, it behooves the 
government estimator to be more accurate or even over-estimate, when estimating larger 
projects.  Again, this initial visual observation of a decrease between the GE and the 
award amount seems reasonable when compared to the overall MILCON system.  
However, it also suggests that the government estimators tend to over-estimate projects 




































Figure 3.8:  Frequency of Award Cost Growth Indices 
 
 Figure 3.9 is a graph of the variation in the Award Cost Growth Indices as a 
function of the GE.  The graph also shows the best-fit line and the best-fit line equation 
for the data.  For Government Estimates from $750,000 to $45,000,000, the average 
Award Cost Growth Index varies from 2.1% to -19.6% respectively.  This graph shows 
that the higher priced projects had a larger percent decrease from the GE to the award 
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amount.  This suggests that the government estimators did over-estimate the projects, 
more so on costlier projects.   

























Figure 3.9:  Award Cost Growth Index as a Function of the Government Estimate 
 
 Although the graphs suggest that this is true for the 84 projects analyzed within 
this thesis, further statistical analysis is necessary to test for the confidence level of this 
statement. 
 Table 3.5 is a summary of the t-test statistical analysis performed on the Award 
Cost Growth Index variables to test whether or not they are statistically similar.   
 
Table 3.5:  Summary of t-Test for the Award Cost Growth Input Variables 
  GE ACWE 
Mean 8857087 8123333 
Variance 8.79E+13 6.95E+13 
Observations 84 84 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
Df 83  
t Stat 4.368338   
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 According to the analysis, the null hypothesis must be rejected with a 99.9% 
significance level.  Therefore, the alternative hypothesis must be accepted.  This means 
the GE and the ACWE are not statistically similar and are therefore regarded as having 
different means and standard deviations.  The t-test statistical analysis proves that there is 
a difference between the Government Estimate and the award amount of the project.  
Figure 3.9 graphically displays the variation between the two costs. 
 
3.2.3.5 Final Cost Growth Index 
 The Final Cost Growth Index represents the percent change from the GE to the 
CWE.  Figure 3.10 shows the frequencies of each Final Cost Growth Index.  The values 
range from -35% to 43% with a mean of -1.1%, a median of 6%, and a mode of -7%.  
The standard deviation of the sample is 15%.  The graph shows a very wide variance in 










































Figure 3.10:  Frequency of Final Cost Growth Indices 
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 Figure 3.11 is a graph of the variation in the Final Cost Growth Indices as a 
function of the GE.  The graph also shows the best-fit line and the best-fit line equation 
for the data.  For Government Estimates from $750,000 to $45,000,000, the average Final 
Cost Growth Index varies from 2.5% to -15.0% respectively.  Again, this graph shows 
that higher priced projects had a larger percent decrease from the GE to the final cost.  
These graphs prove that the government estimators, on average, over-estimated the cost 
of the projects, but only by approximately 1.1%.  The graphs also prove that the 
government estimators over-estimated more on costlier projects.   
























Figure 3.11:  Final Cost Growth Index as a Function of the Government Estimate 
 
 Although the graphs suggest that this is true for the 84 projects analyzed within 
this thesis, further statistical analysis is necessary to test for the confidence level of this 
statement. 
 Table 3.6 is a summary of the t-test statistical analysis performed on the Final 
Cost Growth Index variables to test whether or not they are statistically similar. 
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 Table 3.6:  Summary of t-Test for the Final Cost Growth Input Variables 
  GE CWE 
Mean 8857087 8373453 
Variance 8.79E+13 7.17E+13 
Observations 84 84 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 83  
t Stat 2.864207   
 
 According to the analysis, the null hypothesis must be rejected with a confidence 
level of 99%.  Therefore, the alternate hypothesis must be accepted.  This means the GE 
and the CWE are not statistically similar and are therefore regarded as having different 
means and standard deviations.  The t-test statistical analysis proves that there is a 
difference between the Government Estimate and the award amount of the projects.  
Figure 3.11 graphically displays the difference between the two variables. 
 
3.2.3.6 Construction Cost Growth Index 
    The Construction Cost Growth Index represents the percent change from the 
ACWE to the CWE.  Figure 3.12 shows the frequencies of each Construction Cost 
Growth Index.  The least variance, according to the 84 projects, tends to fall between the 
award amount and the final cost of the project.  Other than one outlier, the percent change 
in the award to the final project cost ranged from -7% to 27% with a mean of 4.1%, 
median of 2%, and mode of 0%.  Due to the extreme outlier, the mean is skewed to the 
positive side.  Therefore, the median and mode are more likely to give a more correct 
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value of the average Construction Cost Growth Index. The standard deviation of the 


































Figure 3.12:  Frequency of Construction Cost Growth Indices 
 
 Figure 3.13 is a graph of the variation in the Construction Cost Growth Indices as 
a function of the ACWE, or the award amount.  The graph also shows the best-fit line and 
the best-fit line equation for the data.  For award amounts from $750,000 to $45,000,000, 
the average Construction Cost Growth Index varies from 5.0% to 1.0% respectively.  
This graph shows that the higher priced projects incurred lower Construction Cost 
Growths.   
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Figure 3.13:  Construction Cost Growth Index as a Function of the Award Amount 
 
 The large number of Construction Cost Growth Indices less than 5% seems 
reasonable when compared to the MILCON process.  Contractors and project personnel 
are aware of the 5% contingency amount allotted by Congress for unforeseen events.  
Therefore, if something unexpected arises, there is money to ensure that the project 
continues.  After the 5% has been spent, it is in the best interest of the government to 
prevent any further changes.   
 Figures 3.12 and 3.13 show that no matter what the awarded price of the 
MILCON project, the Construction Cost Growth should not exceed the 5% allotted by 
Congress.  Although the graphs suggest that this is true for the 84 projects analyzed 
within this thesis, further statistical analysis is necessary to test for the confidence level 
of this statement. 
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 Table 3.7 is a summary of the t-test statistical analysis performed on the 
Construction Cost Growth Index variables to test whether or not they are statistically 
similar.   
 
Table 3.7:  Summary of t-Test for the Construction Cost Growth Input Variables 





Difference 0  
df 83  
t Stat -5.83684   
 
 According to the analysis, the null hypothesis must be rejected with a 99.9% 
significance level.  Therefore, the alternate hypothesis must be accepted.  This means the 
ACWE and the CWE are not statistically similar and are therefore regarded as having 
different means and standard deviations.  The t-test statistical analysis proves that there is 
a difference between the Government Estimate and the award amount of the projects.  
Figure 3.13 graphically shows the percent difference between the two variables. 
 
3.2.3.7 Overall Analysis of Cost Growth Indices 
 Overall, the “V” shape found in Figure 2.2 displays a fairly flat line from the 
Programmed Amount to the Government Estimate.  According to statistical analysis, a 
Planning Cost Growth Index of approximately 0% should be true for most MILCON 
projects.  
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 The second leg of the “V” shape shows an average decrease from the Government 
Estimate to the award amount equal to -4.6%.  According to the t-test, the mean 
difference between the two variables is not equal to zero, which supports the idea that 
there is a usual decrease between them.  However, the data does not provide enough 
evidence to prove that a -4.6% Award Cost Growth is typical for all MILCON projects.  
Visual observation of Figure 2.2 seems to suggest that there is usually a decrease from 
the Government Estimate to the award amount.  However, there is quite a bit of variance 
within the 84 projects.  In fact, the variance observed is approximately 14%.     
 The final leg of the “V” shape shows an average increase from the award amount 
to the final cost of the project equal to 4.1%.  According to the t-test, the mean difference 
between the two variables is not equal to zero, which supports the idea that there is a 
usual increase between them.  However, the data does not provide enough evidence to 
prove that a 4.1% Construction Cost Growth is typical for all MILCON projects.  In fact, 
due to the skewed data caused by the extreme outlier, the actual average Construction 
Cost Growth should be somewhere around 3.4%.  Figure 3.13 shows the Construction 
Cost Growth and how it changes according to the price of the project.  The variance is 
low, at 8%, for the sample and can therefore be used to predict the Construction Cost 
Growth of future projects.  This information also supports the idea that the 5% 
contingency supplied by Congress is sufficient to cover most changes and unforeseen 
situations encountered by MILCON projects from budget lock to facility completion.     
 Additional analysis of the Programming Cost Growth Index allowed a comparison 
between the smaller and larger MILCON project data sets.  From this information, it was 
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discovered that the Programming Cost Growth Indices from each were statistically 
similar and therefore come from the same parent population.  This fact supports the idea 
that the information collected within the smaller data set can be used to represent the 
larger data pool, and therefore, all MILCON projects.  This basis is used to present the 
following analysis of geographic location and project types. 
 
3.2.2 Geographic Location 
 The second analysis of the 84 NAVFAC MILCON projects is performed by 
separating the data with respect to general geographic location.  In this case, the analysis 
is based on the Engineering Field Division responsible for oversight of the project.  The 
four Regions include Atlantic, Pacific, Southern, and Southwest.  The breakdown of 














3.2.3.1 Atlantic Division 
 The 16 Atlantic Division MILCON projects were located within the following 
states:  Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and 
Virginia.   
 The Atlantic Division project estimates and actual costs as a function of project 
phase are displayed graphically in Figure 3.15.  The average of all six Cost Growth 
Indices is listed in Figure 3.29.  The graph visually shows the Government Estimate 
coming in an average of -1% below the Programmed Amount.  Then, the award was 
made for an average of 5% over the Government Estimate (10% over the norm).  The 
average Construction Cost Growth for MILCON projects within the Atlantic Division 
was 4%.  In all, the Atlantic Division spent $6.6 Million, or 6.3%, over their total 



















Figure 3.15: Atlantic Division Projects as a Function of Project Phase 
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 Figure 3.16 shows the distribution of the Planning Cost Growth Indices for the 
Atlantic Division.  Overall, their Planning Cost Growth Indices follows the 0% trend 
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Figure 3.16: Atlantic Division Distribution of Planning Cost Growth 
 
 Figure 3.17 shows the distribution of the Construction Cost Growth Indices for 
the Atlantic Division.  Overall, their Construction Cost Growth Index data follows the 
4.1% trend observed in Section 3.2.1.  In fact, only 3 projects fell outside of the norm: 
• Project #17, an aircraft maintenance facility, reported a 19.8% Construction Cost 
Growth Index due to the change of requirements during construction leading to 
extremely costly change orders and redesign.  Unfortunately, due to security 
reasons, the exact details are unavailable regarding the change of requirements. 
• Project #33, which involved the renovation of an operations building, reported at 
13.3% Construction Cost Growth Index because of $92,000 worth of unforeseen 
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requirement changes, $100,000 worth of customer requested changes, and 
$62,000 worth of redesign. 
• Project #62, which involved airfield pavement upgrades, reported a Construction 
Cost Growth Index of -4.1% due to the cost savings associated with setting up a 
batch plant on-site and the fact that the general contractor owned most of the 




























Figure 3.17: Atlantic Division Distribution of Construction Cost Growth 
 
 
3.2.3.2 Pacific Division 
 The Pacific Division is responsible for projects in Hawaii.  Due to the extremely 
small number of MILCON projects within the Pacific Region, a thorough analysis is very 
difficult to perform.  In all, there were only four projects appropriated in 2001 and 2002 
that have been completed.  Figure 3.18 is a graphical analysis of the four projects 
according to project phase and Figure 3.29 provides the averages of the six Cost Growth 
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Indices.  On average, the Government Estimates came in 9% below the Programmed 
Amount, the awards were made 13% below the Government Estimate, and the projects 
saw an average Construction Cost Growth of 5%.  In all, the Pacific Division saved 

















Figure 3.18: Pacific Division Projects as a Function of Project Phase 
 
 Figure 3.19 is shows the distribution of the Planning Cost Growth Indices for the 
Pacific Division.  There was only one outlier in the data.  Project #77, installation of 
shore power, shows a 31% decrease from the PA to the GE due to extreme scoping 
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Figure 3.19:  Pacific Distribution of Planning Cost Growth 
 
 Figure 3.20 shows the distribution of the Construction Cost Growth Indices for 
the Pacific Division.  Overall, the average Construction Cost Growth came to 5%, which 
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Figure 3.20:  Pacific Distribution of Construction Cost Growth 
 
3.2.3.3 Southern Division 
 The 21 Southern Division MILCON projects were located in the following states:  
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Ohio, South 
Carolina, and Texas.     
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 The Southern Division project data is shown graphically in Figures 3.21 and 3.22.  
Overall, the Government Estimates came in 1% over the Programmed Amount, the award 
was made for 3% below the Government Estimate, and the Construction Cost Growth 
average was 5%.  Overall, across the entire list of 21 projects, the Southern Division 
spent 1.1%, or $1.6 Million, over the Programmed Amount.  The six Cost Growth Indices 


































Figure 3.22:  Southern Division Projects ($10 - $50 Million) as a Function of Project 
Phase  
 
 Figure 3.23 shows the distribution of the Planning Cost Growth Indices for the 
Southern Division.  Overall, the average Planning Cost Growth came to 1%, which is 
extremely close to the 0% expected value from Section 3.2.1.  The following is an 
explanation of two projects that fell outside of the expected range: 
• Project #20, an aircraft maintenance facility, reported a Planning Cost Growth of 
38.8% due to the addition of built-in furniture to the project scope and 8 
modifications to the contract. 
• Project #64, installation of runway lights, reported a 45.8% decrease from the PA 
to the GE due to the installation of a different, and less expensive, type of lighting 
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Figure 3.23: Southern Division Distribution of Planning Cost Growth 
 
 Figure 3.24 shows the distribution of the Construction Cost Growth Indices for 
the Southern Division.  Overall, the average Construction Cost Growth came to 5%, 
which is close to the 4.1% expected value from Section 3.2.1.  There was only one 
extreme outlier in the data.   Project # 18 reported a 62.4% Construction Cost Growth due 
to a complete change in the project during the construction phase.  The original project 
called for the renovation of one smaller aircraft hanger whereas the final project included 
the reconfiguration of a completely different, and much larger, aircraft hanger.  
Otherwise, all projects within the Southern Division fit the norm in terms of their 
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Figure 3.24: Southern Division Distribution of Construction Cost Growth 
 
3.2.3.4 Southwest Division 
 The majority of the projects evaluated in this thesis came from the Southwest 
Division.  In all, there were 43 Southwest Division MILCON projects from the following 
states:  Arizona, California, Nevada, and Washington.   
The Southwest Division data is shown graphically in Figures 3.25 and 3.26.  Overall, the 
Government Estimates for the Southwest Division came in approximately 1% over the 
Programmed Amounts, the awards were made for 8% under the Government Estimates, 
and the Construction Cost Growths came to an average of 3%.  Across the entire list of 




































Figure 3.26:  Southwest Division ($10 - $50 Million) as a Function of Project Phase  
 
 
 Figure 3.27 shows the distribution of the Planning Cost Growth Indices for the 
Southwest Division.  Overall, the average Planning Cost Growth came to 1%, which is 
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Figure 3.27:  Southwest Division Distribution of Planning Cost Growth 
 
 Figure 3.28 shows the distribution of the Construction Cost Growth Indices for 
the Southwest Division.  Overall, the average Construction Cost Growth came to 3%, 
which is slightly less than expected by the analysis from Section 3.2.1.   
 The following is a list of projects that fell outside of the normal range for the 
Southwest Division and the reasons the project managers attributed the Construction Cost 
Growth to:   
• Project # 42, which included the installation of a training facility, reported a 
Construction Cost Growth of 27.3% due to the discovery of unexploded ordnance 
and erosion control problems.  This caused a significant amount of regarding and 
re-vegetation of the site.  
• Project # 44, pier improvements, reported a 14.3% Construction Cost Growth due 
to the unforeseen need to upgrade an electrical substation.  During construction, it 
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was discovered that the base-wide draw was much greater than expected on the 
substation.  Therefore, it could not handle the new demand required by the pier. 
• Project #16, aircraft maintenance facility, reported a Construction Cost Growth of 
12.8% due to an increase in security requirements that were not addressed until 
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Figure 3.28:  Southwest Division Distribution of Construction Cost Growth 
 
3.2.3.5 Comparison of Divisions 
 The graph of Cost Growth Indices (Figure 3.29) shows the Atlantic Division 
falling within the normal or expected range for the Planning and Construction Cost 
Growths.  The graph also indicates that the Atlantic Division routinely underestimates 
their Programmed Amounts and detailed Government Estimates by an average of 8% to 
9% below actual costs.  Only 3 of the 16 projects had an award or final cost lower than 
the Government Estimate.  This information indicates that the planners’ and government 
estimators’ tools and databases used in performing estimates for the Atlantic Division are 
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routinely under-estimating the projects. The inaccuracies could be due to a number of 
different factors such as unforeseen circumstances, improper projected Area Cost Factors 
(ACF) or escalation, insufficient designs, estimating different materials or procedures 
than the contractors, or human error in estimate calculations. 
 The graph of Cost Growth Indices (Figure 3.29) shows the Pacific Division as 
having a far lower final cost than the Programmed Amount and the Government 
Estimate.  Although it is not a bad thing when costs are lower than expected, the numbers 
show the data used for programming and detailed estimates of electrical utilities projects 
in Hawaii are too high.  Initial investigation into possible reasons for the drastically 
negative Overall and Final Cost Growth Indices leads to the idea that improper Area Cost 
Factors and escalation were used in estimating.  Another thought was that programmers 
and estimators tack on, or hide, “extra” money just in case they need it since they are in a 
high-cost area.  However, according to project personnel, there were scoping changes 
made before award and there were very favorable bid climates at the time of each project 
award.  They also attribute the decreased costs for Project #74, a shore power project, to 
the utilization of a general contractor who was already mobilized in the area and who 
could perform much of the work themselves.  These two facts allowed the prime 
contractor to reduce their mobilization and subcontractor fees and allowed them to win 
the contract by coming in as the low bid.  Therefore, the major cause for the extremely 
low final costs, compared to the estimates, is due to the fact that there is an electrical 
contractor in Hawaii who has a strong hold of the market and can underbid all the other 
contractors.  A more detailed analysis of costs compared to project types is made in 
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section 3.2.2 of this thesis.  The average Planning Cost Growth for the Pacific Division is 
equal to -9%.  This is far lower than the average across the 84 MILCON projects as 
described in section 3.2.2.2, but is due to Project #77 that skewed the data due to extreme 
scoping changes before award.  The average Construction Cost Growth for the Pacific 
























































Figure 3.29:  Average Cost Growth Indices per Region (84 Projects) 
 The Southern Division had an average of 2% increase from the PA and the GE to 
the CWE.  Compared to the other divisions, the Southern Division seems to have the best 
programming and detailed estimates.  The average Planning and Construction Cost 
Growth Indices for the Southern Division were 1% and 5% which fall near the expected 
values of 0% and 4.1% respectively.   
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 The Southwest Division had an average of 5% decrease from the PA to the CWE 
and a 5% decrease from the GE to the CWE.  This information seems to suggest that the 
Southwest Division over-estimates their projects.  Again, the inaccuracies could be due to 
a number of different factors.  The average Planning and Construction Cost Growths 
were 1% and 3% respectively, which fall near the expected values.  Compared to the 
other divisions, the Southwest division seems to have the lowest Construction Cost 
Growth.  This suggests that they use better cost controls or they run into less unforeseen 
circumstances than the other divisions. 
 The smaller data set, of 84 projects, suggests specific trends with respect to each 
region.  In order investigate the extent to which these trends are seen throughout 
MILCON projects, it is possible to compare the Programming Cost Growth Index from 







































Figure 3.30:  Average Programming Cost Growth Index per Region (228 Projects) 
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 Unfortunately, the same comparison cannot be made for the other indices since 
the Government Estimates and final costs of the projects are unknown.  Figure 3.30 is a 
graphical representation of the average Programming Cost Growth Index by geographical 
region.  When compared to the smaller data set, the indices seem to mimic each other.  
The Atlantic Division shows a 4% increase for the smaller data set and a 1% increase for 
the larger data set.  The Pacific Division shows a 21% decrease for the smaller data set 
and a 12% decrease for the larger data set.  The Southern Division shows a 2% and 1% 
decrease respectively.  And the Southwest Division shows an 8% and 7% decrease 
respectively.  This analysis suggests that the indices from the smaller data set represent 
the indices found in the larger data set and, therefore, are typical of what should be 
expected from all MILCON projects within these regions. 
 The previous analysis touched slightly on possible reasons for the variations of 
project cost indices between the regions.  However, there are many other reasons why 
project costs fluctuate.  This thesis does not attempt to identify every possible reason why 
costs may increase or decrease.  Further research should investigate price fluctuations due 
to weather, fluctuating Area Cost Factors, improper escalation, miscalculated planning 
and detailed estimates, and human error. 
 
3.2.3 Project Type 
 The third analysis of the 84 MILCON projects is made by a separation of the data 
with respect to the general type of facility being built or upgrading.  The nine project 
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facility types are listed below.  The breakdown of MILCON projects within each type is 
















Figure 3.31:  Distribution of MILCON projects within each project type 
 
 Housing:  (14 projects) Bachelor Enlisted Quarters (BEQ), BEQ modernization, 
BEQ replacement, recruit barracks, and transient quarters. 
  
 Maintenance facilities:  (13 projects) aircraft, engine, ship, and vehicle 
maintenance facilities. 
  
 Operations Facilities:  (16 projects) air passenger terminals, operations towers, 
training and instruction facilities, Navy and Marine Corps reserve centers, and 
testing labs.   
  
 Piers:  (4 projects) pier improvements, pier replacements, and berthing piers.  
  
 Property Control Facilities:  (11 projects) armories/ordnance/ammunition 
facilities, hazardous material storage facilities, magazines, and warehouses. 
 
 Runway projects:  (7 projects) lighting, aircraft parking aprons, and 
runway/airfield improvements.  
  
 Security:  (7 projects) Anti-terrorism/Force-Protection (AT/FP) improvements, 
security support facilities, gate improvements, visitor processing centers, security 
fencing, and security lighting. 
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Utilities:  (6 projects) shore power installations, electrical upgrades, sewer line 
replacements, water treatment facility upgrades, water tanks, and sewage 
treatment plants. 
  
 Various Other Base Facilities:  (6 projects) bridge replacements, cut/fill disposal 
areas, dental clinics, fire stations, fitness centers, galleys, museums, child 
development centers, churches, and recreational facilities. 
  
  
 Table 3.8 is the breakdown of the Average Planning and Construction Cost 
Growth Indices according to each facility type.  None of the values listed are outside of 
the mean and standard deviation found in Section 3.2.1 of this thesis.  However, the 
following analysis may uncover additional trends in the data according to facility type. 
 
Table 3.8:  Average Planning, Award, and Construction Cost Growth Indices by Facility 
Type 




Cost Growth Index 
Housing 1.6% -11.7% 2.0% 
Maintenance Facilities 1.4% -8.8% 11.2% 
Operations Facilities 1.3% -2.7% 4.4% 
Piers -1.5% -3.6% 7.1% 
Property Control Facilities 1.9% 0.9% 3.1% 
Runway Projects -4.2% -8.1% 2.2% 
Security 3.0% 0.2% -0.2% 
Utilities -5.9% -5.4% 2.0% 
Various Other Base Facilities -3.7% 1.3% 3.3% 
Average -0.7% -4.2% 3.9% 
 
3.2.3.1 Housing 
 Figure 3.32 is a graphical representation of the 14 housing projects examined in 
this thesis.  In general, it is expected that housing projects would be the easiest to 
estimate since there are so many prior examples to work from.  Additionally, the Navy’s 
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housing projects are comparable to the Army’s and Air Forces’ and even civilian hotels.  
According to Figure 3.32, the projects tend to follow the expected MILCON growth 
indices.  The projects display only a 1.6% increase from the Programmed Amount to the 
Government Estimate and only a 2% increase from the award amount to the final cost of 
the project.  However, there is a large decrease (-11.7% Award Cost Growth) from the 
GE to the ACWE.  This seems to suggest that the Navy over estimates both its 
























3.2.3.2 Maintenance Facilities 
 Figure 3.33 displays the 13 maintenance facility projects analyzed in this thesis 
according to their project phases.  The maintenance facilities recorded an average 
Planning Cost Growth of 1.4% and a decrease in the Award Cost Growth, as expected.  
The interesting data regarding maintenance facilities is the 11.2% Construction Cost 
Growth Index, whereas only a maximum of 5% is expected for MILCON projects.  The 
average Construction Cost Growth Index for maintenance facilities is the highest of all 
types of projects.   
 This fact is due to three projects in particular:   
• Project #18 reported a 62.4% Construction Cost Growth due to a complete change 
in the project during the construction phase.  The original project had previously 
called for the renovation of a smaller aircraft hanger whereas the final project 
turned into the reconfiguration of a completely different, and much larger, aircraft 
hanger.  This extreme outlier has a very large effect on the data and skews it far to 
the right, or positive direction.   
• Project, #17, also an aircraft maintenance facility, reported a high Construction 
Cost Growth of 19.8% as described in Section 3.2.2.1, due to very costly changes 
in requirements during construction.   
• Project #16, another aircraft maintenance facility, reported a 12.8% Construction 
Cost Growth due to increased security requirements. 
 
 65
 Overall, the Construction Cost Growth Index average for maintenance facilities is 
much higher than the expected range according to Section 3.2.1.  This information seems 
to suggest that not enough pre-project planning is taking place on maintenance facilities, 
and aircraft hangar projects in particular.  Unfortunately, due to security reasons, the 
exact change of equipment and requirements is not allowed to be released.  The only 
information that can be extracted from these case studies is that aircraft maintenance 
hangars require additional thought and planning prior to construction in order to decrease 
the cost of changes.  “Experienced managers agree the time to achieve savings and 
reduce changes is in the early life of the project, not at the start of construction” 
























3.2.3.3 Operations Facilities 
  Figure 3.34 shows the 16 operations facilities’ costs as a function of project 
phase.  Overall, the data seems to mimic what is expected from the previous analysis in 
Section 3.2.1.  There were only 2 projects out of 16 that did not fit the norm.  Project #42, 
which included the construction of a training facility, saw a 27.3% Construction Cost 
Growth due to the discovery of unexploded ordnance and erosion control problems.  And, 
Project #33, the renovation of an operations building, saw a Construction Cost Growth of 




















Figure 3.34: Estimates and Costs of Operations Facility Projects  
 
 
 Overall, most projects within this category followed the expected trends for 
MILCON projects.  For example, project #29, a training facility, reported Planning, 
Award, and Construction Cost Growths of 0.8%, 1%, and 3.2% respectively.  When 
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asked, the Project Manager accounted for the “ideal” conditions by stating that they had 
“a good market, good contractors, no major changes, and very few unforeseen problems.”   
 
3.2.3.4 Piers 
 Figure 3.35 is the graphical representation of the estimates and costs for the pier 
projects as a function of project phase.  There were only 4 projects within this category 
and all were located in the Southwest Division.  In fact, until recently, there were not 
enough pier projects listed within the HII database to allow the forecasting of costs.  The 
pier projects reported indices within the expected ranges, but displayed a slightly higher 
than expected average Construction Cost Growth due to one project in particular.  Project 
# 44, pier improvements, reported a 14.3% Construction Cost Growth due to the need to 

















Figure 3.35:  Estimates and Costs of Pier Projects  
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3.2.3.5 Property Control Facilities 
 Figure 3.36 is the graphical representation of the estimates and costs for the 
property control facility projects as a function of project phase.  There were 11 projects 
within this category.   
 According to Table 3.8, these types of facilities indices’ fall into the normal range 
of what is expected for MILCON projects.  A Property Control Facility, which is a fancy 
name for a warehouse, is the most basic type of facility the Navy or any military service 
acquires at the MILCON level.  Due to this fact, it is expected that this type of facility be 
















Figure 3.36: Estimates and Costs of Warehouse Facility Projects  
 
3.2.3.6 Runway Projects 
 Figure 3.37 is the graphical representation of the estimates and costs for the 
runway projects as a function of project phase.  There were a total of 7 projects within 
this category.  The average Planning, Award, and Construction Cost Growth Indices for 
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this category were all below the norm.  This suggests that these types of projects are 
over-estimated.   
 Project #64, in particular, displayed a 45.8% decrease in the Planning Cost 
Growth due to the installation of a different type of runway lighting than was originally 
programmed for, as described previously in Section 3.2.2.3.  The 1391 for this project 
was based on the replacement of the same (existing) runway lighting.  During the design 
phase, a new and improved lighting system was identified for use instead.  The new 
lighting required less electrical equipment, cabling, and duct work, resulting in lowered 
costs.  It also required a significantly smaller building (vault) and used less energy.  The 
final cost came out lower than the Programmed Amount set aside for the project years 






















 Figure 3.38 is the graphical representation of the estimates and costs for the 
security projects as a function of project phase.  There were a total of 7 projects within 
this category.  Security projects recorded the highest average Planning Cost Growth 
















Figure 3.38:  Estimates and Costs of Security Projects 
 
  This information seems to suggest that the proper pre-project planning took place 
between the programming and the detailed estimates.  This would account for the 
extremely low average Construction Cost Growth for security projects. 
 
3.2.3.8 Utilities 
 Figure 3.39 is the graphical representation of the estimates and costs for the 
utilities projects as a function of project phase.  There were a total of 6 projects within 
this category.  Utilities projects recorded the most negative Planning Cost Growth out of 
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all the project types, at -5.9%.  Additionally, utilities projects reported another decrease 
from the Government Estimate to the award amount.  This seems to suggest, once again, 


















Figure 3.39:  Estimates and Costs of Utilities Projects 
 
3.2.3.9 Various Other Base Facilities 
 Figure 3.40 is the graphical representation of the estimates and costs for the 
various other base facility projects as a function of project phase.  There were a total of 6 
projects within this category.  Overall, the trends observed in this category follow the 



















Figure 3.40:  Estimates and Costs of Various Other Base Facility Projects 
 
3.2.3.10 Comparison of Project Types  
 Figure 3.41 shows the average Programming Cost Growth Indices for both the 
small and large data sets found in Appendix A and B.  According to this figure, the 
average Programming Cost Growth Indices for each project type follow the same trends 
in both the large and small data sets.  Again, this comparison shows how the smaller data 























































Figure 3.41:  Comparison of Average Programming Cost Growth Index for Both Small 
(84 Projects) and Large (228 Projects) Data Sets 
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  In general, housing, maintenance, runway, and utilities projects were all 
overestimated in both their programming and detailed estimates.  However, the 
maintenance facilities then required major changes during construction which cost a great 
deal more than if the changes had been made earlier in the project lifecycle. 
 The operations, property control, security, and various other facilities were all 
fairly ideal in their indices.  Security projects, in particular, displayed the greatest change 
between the PA and the GE and a very slight increase (0.2%) in their Construction Cost 
Growth.  This suggests that the proper pre-project planning took place and produced the 
lowest average Construction Cost Growth Index of all project types.  
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Chapter 4:  Conclusions 
4.1 Findings 
 The purpose of this thesis was to identify undeniable trends in MILCON project 
data in an effort to find reasons for why all projects do not follow the trends and possible 
ways of correcting this.  The first analysis was done through the calculation of various 
project cost indices.  The second analysis was done through a division of the projects by 
geographic location.  Finally, the third analysis was done through a division of the 
projects by type.  The following is a summary of the findings. 
 
4.1.1 Project Index Findings 
 According to the 84 completed projects, a 0% Planning Cost Growth Index is 
expected for all MILCON projects.  This was proven using a t-test between the 
Programmed Amount and the Government Estimate.  The results concluded that the two 
estimates had approximately the same mean and standard deviation and therefore come 
from the same parent population.  This finding matches the idea that the Government 
Estimators do not estimate around the project.  Rather, they estimate the project around 
the Programmed Amount. 
 The Programming Cost Growth Index yielded a mean of 5% and a median of -3% 
from the Programmed Amount to the Award Amount.  It was found that higher priced 
projects resulted in a lower Programming Cost Growth.  However, there was not enough 
statistical evidence to prove the exact percent that should be expected for all MILCON 
projects without further analysis.  Project data for an additional 144 awarded MILCON 
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projects was compared to the original 84 completed MILCON projects to see if their 
Programming Cost Growth Indices were statistically similar.  The t-test proved that they 
do, in fact, have similar means and standard deviations and therefore come from the same 
parent population.  According to this test, the average Programming Cost Growth for all 
MILCON projects is expected to be near -2.2%.  This means that the HII database and 
other long-term estimators are very accurate in predicting the award amount of the 
projects.         
 The average Overall Cost Growth Index across the 84 completed projects was 
found to be -1.4%.  However, there was not enough statistical evidence to prove that this 
is standard for all MILCON projects.  From graphical analysis, it was discovered that the 
higher priced projects reported a more negative Overall Coat Growth Index.  This means 
that the HII database and other long-range estimating tools slightly overestimated the 
price of MILCON projects (more so on expensive projects greater than $10 Million).   
 The average Award Cost Growth Index was found to be -4.9%.  Once again, there 
was not enough statistical evidence to prove that this is standard for all MILCON 
projects.  However, from graphical analysis, it was found that most projects (63%) 
reported a negative Award Cost Growth Index and higher priced projects reported a more 
negative Award Cost Growth Index than lower priced projects.  This means that the 
detailed government estimators and the tools they use tend to overestimate MILCON 
projects (more so on larger projects greater than $10 Million). 
 The average Final Cost Growth Index was found to e -1.1%.  There was not 
enough statistical evidence to prove that this percent is standard for all MILCON 
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projects.  Graphical analysis does indicate that higher priced projects resulted in a more 
negative Final Cost Growth Index.  Again, this means that the detailed government 
estimators and the tools they use tend to slightly overestimate MILCON projects. 
 The average Construction Cost Growth Index was found to be 4.1%.  There was 
not enough statistical evidence to prove that this percent is standard for all MILCON 
projects.  However, the analysis does indicate that the Construction Cost Growth Index is 
almost always positive and less than 5%.  This coincides with the idea that the contractor 
and project team members all know they are allotted only 5% contingency.  This means 
they are willing to accept changes up to that amount, but reluctant to go beyond.  Since 
73% of the MILCON projects within this thesis fall below the 5% limit, this leads to the 
conclusion that the contingency amount set aside by Congress is a reasonable and 
sufficient amount to account for unexpected and unforeseen costs from the budget lock to 
the facility completion. 
 
4.1.2 Project Location Findings 
 The Atlantic Division’s Planning and Construction Cost Growth Indices fell 
within the expected range.  However, it was discovered that their planners and 
government estimators routinely underestimate the PA and GE by approximately 9% 
below actual costs. 
 The Pacific Division displayed a -9% Planning Cost Growth Index due to scoping 
changes made before award.  Additionally, final costs were far below the estimates due to 
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a favorable bid climate during award.  The average Construction Cost Growth for the 
Pacific Division was 5% which fell within the expected range for this index. 
 The Southern Division displayed an average increase of 2% from the PA and the 
GE to the CWE.  Compared to the other divisions, the Southern Division has the best 
programming and detailed estimates.  The average Planning and Construction Cost 
Growth Indices for the Southern Division fell within the normal, or expected, ranges.  
 The Southwest Division displayed an average 5% decrease from the PA to the 
CWE and a 5% decrease from the GE to the CWE.  This information shows that the 
Southwest Division overestimates their MILCON projects.  The average Planning and 
Construction Cost Growths fell near the expected ranges for these indices.  Compared to 
the other divisions, the Southwest division has the lowest Construction Cost Growth.  
This means they use better cost controls and run into less unforeseen circumstances than 
the other divisions. 
 An overall analysis of the Programming Cost Growth Indices for each region 
using both the small (84 completed MILCON projects) and large (228 awarded MILCON 
projects) data sets shows the similarities between them.  This analysis confirms that the 
indices from the smaller data set represent the indices found in the larger data set and, 






4.1.3 Project Type Findings 
 Overall, the housing, maintenance, runway, and utilities projects were 
overestimated.  In addition, the aircraft maintenance facilities produced too many 
changes after award and resulted in extremely high Construction Cost Growths.   
 The operations, property control, security, and various other facilities projects 
produced the expected average indices.  Security projects, in particular, displayed cost 
growth indices which suggest the proper pre-project planning took place and produced an 
extremely low average Construction Cost Growth Index.    
 
4.2 Perceptions  
 The following is a list of perceptions and suggestions based upon the findings of 
this thesis.  Further ideas for their implementation are presented in Chapter 5.   
• The MILCON process needs to incorporate various incentives to encourage lower 
programming and detailed estimates.  In particular, the government estimators 
need to have incentives to estimate around the actual project requirements rather 
than the Programmed Amount. 
• The Historical Cost Analysis Generator, HII, and other long-range planning tools 
used by NAVFAC are very good at forecasting actual costs.  The use of such tools 
should be encouraged throughout the tri-services.  
• Government estimators overestimate MILCON projects on a regular basis.  
However, this is to be expected based on the current workings of the system and 
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cannot be changed without altering laws.  Additionally, the MILCON process is 
self-leveling and therefore produces the necessary results. 
• The 5% contingency set aside by Congress is a reasonable and sufficient amount 
to assist with unforeseen circumstances. 
• The Southern Division has the best programming and detailed estimates.  Their 
estimating practices should be evaluated and presented to the other divisions. 
• The Southwest Division overestimates their projects, but has the lowest 
Construction Cost Growth.  Their cost control techniques should be evaluated and 
presented to the other divisions.   
• Aircraft Hangar Maintenance Facility projects require much more pre-project 
planning than is currently being performed.   
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Chapter 5:  Recommendations 
5.1 Possible Solutions 
 From the research performed within this thesis, suggestions for improving the 
MILCON process have been made.  These suggestions will not only decrease costs, but 
can also assist in creating a more accurate, predictable, and reliable MILCON system. 
 The following is a list of ways to implement the suggestion presented in Section 
4.2 of this thesis. 
 The first suggestion for improving the MILCON process is to add incentives to 
keep costs low.  Currently, money not spent on a project can be recalled by Congress for 
re-allocation to other MILCON projects.  The MILCON process should be changed to 
automatically allow the divisions to self-allocate a percentage of any savings within their 
own divisions.  For example, if a MILCON project only costs 90% of the PA, then only 
5% could be recalled by Congress and the other 5% could be re-allocated to another 
MILCON project within that region if needed.  This type of change would encourage the 
divisions to perform detailed designs and estimates around the needed project, rather than 
the amount of money they have to work with.  Additionally, it will assist in lowering the 
Construction Cost Growth of MILCON projects. 
 Another finding and suggestion from this thesis is that the Historical Cost 
Analysis Generator (HII) and other long-range planning tools used by NAVFAC are very 
effective in projecting actual costs and should therefore be kept in use and up to date.  It 
is important that all MILCON data for the tri-services be entered into these databases in a 
timely manner to facilitate the most accurate cost estimates possible.  There will always 
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be individuals and offices that refuse to input such information into these databases.  
Therefore, their use should be considered mandatory and enforced by the tri-services. 
 Another observation made through the analysis within this thesis is that the 5% 
contingency amount set aside by Congress is sufficient to cover unforeseen 
circumstances.  However, the average Construction Cost Growth is only 4.1%.  This 
suggests that if the contingency amount were reduced to 4%, it may be possible to 
encourage an even lower average Construction Cost Growth Index in future projects.   
 Through the analysis of the four NAVFAC divisions, it was discovered that the 
Southern Division had the best programming and detailed estimates, while the Southwest 
Division had the lowest Construction Cost Growth Index.  This suggests that these 
divisions’ practices should be evaluated and presented to the other divisions.  While each 
division is presented with similar tools, it is best to evaluate those that are actually being 
used and their usefulness.  Without a feedback loop, past experience and knowledge will 
be lost.   
According to NAVFAC, because the Southern Division has shown the best track 
record for cost estimating, they have been designated as the “Chair” on a new Cost 
Consistency Review Board.  The review board began in the fall of 2004 and is composed 
of the lead cost estimating experts at each of the Divisions and Headquarters.  The 
purpose of the board is to ensure “like facilities are being estimated in a similar manner 
using similar cost estimating tools, correct historical cost data, appropriate area cost 
factors, and reasonable judgment where unique requirements or unknowns are 
‘guestimated’”(Viohl, 2005).  Through this new Cost Consistency Review Board, the 
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hope is that the Southern Division’s exceptional estimating practices can be identified 
and disseminated to the other Divisions. 
 Through the analysis of the nine facility types, it was discovered that the Aircraft 
Maintenance Facilities, in particular, need more pre-project planning.  According to 
NAVFAC, new meetings have been created to handle these types of complex projects in 
a proactive manner.  One meeting, called the Function Analysis Concept Development 
(FACD), requires all parties involved in a project to meet for one to two weeks to discuss 
the project in detail.  The project is presented and then modified (iterative process) until it 
is satisfactorily complete to the parties involved.  The hope is to have a 35% design at the 
end of the FACD meeting.  The process was started in 1996 by the Pacific Division and 
has since spread through the tri-services even though it was never enacted into official 
policy.   
More recently, the Southern Division has created a similar meeting called the 
Functional Analysis Requirements Definition (FARD).  The idea behind the FARD is 
essentially the same as the FACD, yet it is utilized at an earlier stage of the project 
development.  The FARD is used to set the budget for the necessary design instead of 
creating a design for the allotted budget.  This results in a more accurate and less 
“padded” design.  NAVFAC has decided to include the FARD as official policy in their 
new corporate business procedures.     
The use of FACD and FARD meetings should be encouraged and enforced for 
aircraft maintenance facilities and any other projects which are complex due to 
requirements or the number of participants involved.    
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 Using the suggestions for implementation listed above, it is possible to improve 
the MILCON process and ensure less variability in estimates and costs.  The following is 
a summary of contributions and suggestions for future research surrounding the 
MILCON process. 
 
5.2 Summary of Contributions  
 This thesis aimed at evaluating the accuracy of the Military Construction process 
in projecting actual costs and its suitability in preventing major cost overruns.  Project 
data from the last 84 completed and 228 awarded NAVFAC MILCON projects was 
evaluated on the basis of cost indices, project geographic location, and project type.  
Following these analyses, variations from the norm were identified and suggestions were 
made for improvement of the MILCON process.   
 The suggestions made include:  providing incentives to project team members for 
keeping costs low; enforcing the use of HII and other estimating databases; decreasing 
the contingency amount allotted by Congress to 4%; evaluating the estimating practices 
of the Southern Division; evaluating the cost control techniques used by the Southwest 
Division; and encouraging the use of FACD meetings for complex projects.    
 
5.3 Future Research  
 This thesis merely touches on a few of the possible changes that could be made to 
improve the MILCON process.  In order to continue improving, it is important that future 
research continues to explore the MILCON process across the tri-services.   
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 Future research in this area should examine incentives offered in the civilian 
construction industry that could be modified and utilized on MILCON projects.  
Additional research should identify all estimating and tracking tools (including those 
found within TRACES), and the extent to which they are being used in performing 
programming and detailed estimates across the tri-services.  From this research, it would 
also be useful to know which tools are more accurate in projecting actual costs.  
 This thesis touched on the differences between the geographic locations and 
MILCON project types.  However, future research should evaluate time as a possible 
factor of increased costs once projects have been accumulated in a single database over 


























# APPR FY EFD GENERAL  SPECIFIC  
1 MCON  2002 S Housing BEQ 
2 MCON  2002 R Housing BEQ 
3 MCON  2002 L Housing BEQ 
4 MCON  2002 R Housing BEQ 
5 MCON  2002 R Housing BEQ 
6 MCON  2002 R Housing BEQ 
7 MCON  2003 R Housing BEQ 
8 MCON  2002 R Housing BEQ 
9 MCON  2002 S Housing BEQ 
10 MCON  2002 P Housing BEQ Modernization 
11 MCON  2002 S Housing Recruit Barracks 
12 MCON  2002 S Housing Recruit Barracks 
13 MCON  2002 R Housing Transient BEQ 
14 MCON  2002 L Housing Transient BEQ 
15 MCON  2002 R Maint Fac Aircraft Maint Fac 
16 MCON  2002 R Maint Fac Aircraft Maint Fac 
17 MCON  2002 L Maint Fac Aircraft Maint Fac 
18 MCNR 2002 S Maint Fac Aircraft Maint Fac 
19 MCON  2002 L Maint Fac Aircraft Maint Fac 
20 MCON  2002 S Maint Fac Aircraft Maint Fac 
21 MCNR 2003 S Maint Fac Engine Maint Shop 
22 MCON  2002 R Maint Fac Maint Fac 
23 MCON  2003 R Maint Fac Maint Fac 
24 MCON  2002 R Maint Fac Maint Fac 
25 MCON  2003 R Maint Fac Vehicle Maint Fac 
26 MCNR 2002 R Maint Fac Vehicle Maint Fac 
27 MCON  2002 R Maint Fac Vehicle Maint Fac 
28 MCON  2003 R Ops Fac Air Passenger Trmnl 
29 MCON  2002 L Ops Fac Instruction Facility 
30 MCON  2002 R Ops Fac Instruction Facility 
31 MCNR 2002 S Ops Fac Marine Crps Rsrv Ctr 
32 MCNR 2001 L Ops Fac Marine Crps Rsrv Ctr 
33 MCON  2001 L Ops Fac Operations Building 
34 MCON  2001 R Ops Fac Operations Building 
35 MCON  2002 S Ops Fac Operations Building 
36 MCON  2003 R Ops Fac Operations Tower 
37 MCON  2002 R Ops Fac Operations Tower 
38 MCNR 2002 S Ops Fac Reserve Center 
39 MCON  2002 R Ops Fac Reserve Center 
40 MCNR 2003 S Ops Fac Reserve Center 
41 MCON  2002 R Ops Fac Training Facility 
42 MCON  2001 R Ops Fac Training Facility 
43 MCON  2002 R Ops Fac Training Facility 
44 MCON  2002 R Piers Pier Improvements 
 87
# APPR FY EFD GENERAL  SPECIFIC  
45 MCON  2002 R Piers Pier Replacement 
46 MCON  2001 R Piers Berthing Pier 
47 MCON  2002 R Piers Berthing Pier 
48 MCON  2002 S Prprty Ctrl Fac Ammunitions Facility 
49 MCON  2001 L Prprty Ctrl Fac Armory 
50 MCON  2003 L Prprty Ctrl Fac Armory 
51 MCNR 2003 S Prprty Ctrl Fac HAZMAT Storage 
52 MCON  2002 L Prprty Ctrl Fac Magazines 
53 MCON  2002 R Prprty Ctrl Fac Ordnance Facility 
54 MCON  2003 R Prprty Ctrl Fac Ordnance Facility 
55 MCON  2002 S Prprty Ctrl Fac Warehouse 
56 MCON  2002 L Prprty Ctrl Fac Warehouse 
57 MCON  2002 L Prprty Ctrl Fac Warehouse 
58 MCON  2002 L Prprty Ctrl Fac Warehouse 
59 MCON  2003 R Runway Prjct Aircraft Parking 
60 MCON  2002 R Runway Prjct Aircraft Parking  
61 MCON  2003 R Runway Prjct Aircraft Parking  
62 MCON  2002 L Runway Prjct Airfield Improvements 
63 MCON  2001 S Runway Prjct Airfield Improvements 
64 MCON  2002 S Runway Prjct Runway Lights 
65 MCON  2003 S Runway Prjct Runway Lights 
66 MCON  2003 S Security Gate Improvements 
67 MCON  2003 R Security Security Fencing 
68 MCON  2003 R Security Security Fencing 
69 MCON  2003 R Security Security Lighting 
70 MCON  2003 R Security Security Lighting 
71 MCNR 2003 S Security Visitor Processing Ctr 
72 MCON  2003 L Security Visitor Processing Ctr 
73 MCON  2003 R Utilities Electrical Upgrades 
74 MCON  2002 P Utilities Electrical Upgrades 
75 MCON  2002 R Utilities Electrical Upgrades 
76 MCON  2001 P Utilities Sewer 
77 MCON  2002 P Utilities Shore Power 
78 MCON  2002 R Utilities Wtr Trtmnt Fac Upgrd 
79 MCNR 2002 S Base Amnty Bridge Replacement 
80 MCON  2002 L Base Amnty Cut/Fill Area 
81 MCON  2003 R Base Amnty Dental Clinic 
82 MCON  2002 L Base Amnty Fire Station 
83 MCON  2002 R Base Amnty Fitness Center 
84 MCON  2002 R Base Amnty Galley 
 
 88
#  PA  PA DATE GE GE DATE 
1 $8,914,000 Nov-01 $9,400,716 May-02 
2 $20,973,000 Dec-01 $19,115,200 Jan-02 
3 $9,705,000 Oct-01 $8,310,000 Jul-01 
4 $21,369,000 Dec-01 $19,479,200 Jan-02 
5 $9,903,000 Nov-01 $9,027,200 Jan-02 
6 $46,734,000 Dec-01 $42,608,800 Jan-02 
7 $25,354,000 Dec-02 $23,244,000 Jan-03 
8 $29,357,000 Dec-01 $26,769,600 Jan-02 
9 $16,244,000 Nov-01 $14,763,000 Mar-02 
10 $23,050,000 Dec-01 $21,000,000 Sep-01 
11 $40,690,000 May-02 $39,700,000 Jul-01 
12 $40,690,000 May-02 $39,700,000 Jul-01 
13 $23,268,000 Dec-01 $21,216,000 Jan-02 
14 $14,463,000 Dec-02 $12,048,000 Aug-01 
15 $4,422,000 Dec-01 $4,020,000 Jan-02 
16 $3,433,000 Dec-01 $3,110,000 Jan-02 
17 $3,067,000 Oct-01 $2,628,300 Jan-02 
18 $3,702,000 Nov-01 $2,820,000 Jan-01 
19 $11,179,000 Dec-01 $9,900,000 Nov-01 
20 $3,334,000 Oct-00 $4,196,000 Nov-00 
21 $1,500,000 Jun-02 $1,337,067 Dec-02 
22 $6,747,000 Dec-01 $6,146,400 Jan-02 
23 $5,805,000 Dec-02 $5,324,800 Jan-03 
24 $13,019,000 Dec-01 $11,866,400 Jan-02 
25 $5,451,000 Oct-02 $5,002,400 Jan-03 
26 $989,000 Nov-01 $904,800 Jan-02 
27 $5,303,000 Dec-01 $4,836,000 Jan-02 
28 $7,940,000 Oct-02 $7,280,000 Jan-03 
29 $15,126,000 Oct-01 $13,835,929 Mar-02 
30 $9,754,000 Dec-01 $8,892,000 Jan-02 
31 $5,141,000 Sep-99 $4,970,000 Sep-00 
32 $9,100,000 Oct-00 $8,175,000 Mar-01 
33 $2,100,000 Dec-00 $2,080,464 Jan-01 
34 $8,860,000 Oct-00 $8,360,000 Nov-00 
35 $7,281,000 Nov-01 $6,628,000 Jan-02 
36 $2,191,000 Dec-02 $1,976,000 Jan-03 
37 $6,678,000 Dec-01 $6,094,400 Jul-02 
38 $4,376,000 Dec-01 $4,050,000 Jan-02 
39 $8,666,000 Dec-01 $7,904,000 Jan-02 
40 $1,040,000 Oct-02 $860,000 Nov-02 
41 $3,740,000 Nov-01 $3,411,200 Jan-02 
42 $4,000,000 Oct-00 $3,770,000 Nov-00 
43 $8,518,000 Dec-01 $7,768,800 Jan-02 
44 $12,267,000 Nov-01 $11,180,000 Jan-02 
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#  PA  PA DATE GE GE DATE 
45 $24,198,000 Dec-01 $21,693,132 Jan-02 
46 $35,700,000 Oct-00 $32,700,000 Nov-00 
47 $17,313,000 Dec-01 $14,433,962 Jan-02 
48 $5,758,000 Jan-02 $5,368,200 Apr-02 
49 $14,000,000 Oct-00 $12,568,000 Oct-00 
50 $4,166,000 Aug-00 $4,593,400 Jan-02 
51 $2,690,000 Jul-02 $2,346,556 Dec-02 
52 $5,817,000 Oct-01 $5,455,000 Aug-01 
53 $7,083,000 Dec-01 $6,440,000 Jan-02 
54 $7,221,000 Dec-02 $6,853,600 Jan-03 
55 $1,939,000 Nov-01 $1,890,000 Feb-00 
56 $2,244,000 Oct-02 $2,244,000 Feb-03 
57 $2,463,000 Dec-01 $1,777,000 Nov-01 
58 $1,543,000 Dec-01 $1,341,000 Nov-01 
59 $8,313,000 Oct-02 $7,893,600 Jan-03 
60 $3,868,000 Dec-01 $3,510,000 Jan-02 
61 $2,952,000 Dec-02 $2,714,400 Jan-03 
62 $6,292,000 Jun-01 $5,200,000 Apr-01 
63 $3,140,000 Jul-00 $2,830,000 Jan-01 
64 $2,117,000 Dec-01 $1,040,991 May-02 
65 $974,000 Apr-03 $1,061,181 Jan-03 
66 $1,574,000 Oct-02 $1,621,000 Mar-03 
67 $8,368,000 Dec-02 $6,975,030 Jan-03 
68 $2,012,000 Oct-02 $1,892,800 Jan-03 
69 $7,073,000 Dec-02 $6,635,200 Jan-03 
70 $1,574,000 Dec-02 $1,414,400 Jan-03 
71 $1,500,000 Oct-02 $1,191,278 Feb-02 
72 $2,680,000 Oct-02 $2,931,000 Aug-02 
73 $3,473,000 Oct-02 $3,192,800 Jan-03 
74 $11,970,000 Dec-01 $10,724,000 Jan-02 
75 $3,858,000 Dec-01 $3,500,000 Jan-02 
76 $6,900,000 Oct-00 $6,000,000 Apr-04 
77 $5,936,000 Dec-01 $3,700,000 Dec-02 
78 $6,084,000 Dec-01 $5,520,000 Jan-02 
79 $1,285,000 Aug-00 $979,362 Jun-02 
80 $4,400,000 Dec-01 $3,951,880 Apr-02 
81 $2,380,000 Dec-02 $2,152,800 Apr-02 
82 $3,749,000 Dec-01 $3,200,000 Oct-01 
83 $13,316,000 Dec-01 $12,147,200 Jan-02 
84 $11,802,000 Dec-01 $10,764,000 Jan-02 
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 #  ACWE  ACWE DATE  CWE  
CWE 
DATE 
1 $9,951,955 Jan-03 $9,928,229 May-04 
2 $16,396,580 Mar-02 $16,377,967 Jul-04 
3 $8,999,692 Jan-02 $9,259,769 Jan-04 
4 $15,905,906 Jun-02 $16,157,804 Jun-04 
5 $7,027,295 Feb-02 $7,089,910 Jun-03 
6 $40,596,176 Jul-02 $39,856,727 Oct-04 
7 $18,018,480 Dec-02 $18,814,726 Apr-04 
8 $22,963,460 Apr-02 $22,903,458 Jan-04 
9 $14,293,400 Aug-02 $14,471,104 Aug-04 
10 $21,201,540 Jan-02 $22,634,380 Nov-04 
11 $37,457,866 May-02 $38,390,171 Jan-04 
12 $37,457,866 May-02 $38,383,312 Mar-04 
13 $18,066,400 Mar-02 $18,258,808 Sep-03 
14 $13,045,000 Jan-02 $13,870,005 May-04 
15 $3,192,640 Jan-02 $3,396,133 Mar-03 
16 $3,332,192 Jan-02 $3,759,861 Aug-03 
17 $3,106,879 Mar-02 $3,722,957 May-03 
18 $2,192,716 Sep-02 $3,560,840 Mar-04 
19 $12,137,540 Dec-01 $12,670,553 Sep-03 
20 $3,578,952 Mar-01 $3,615,372 May-03 
21 $1,475,649 Mar-03 $1,497,718 May-04 
22 $6,193,400 May-02 $6,418,953 Sep-03 
23 $5,409,272 Apr-03 $5,710,389 Aug-04 
24 $10,024,282 Aug-02 $10,055,546 Apr-04 
25 $4,704,280 Apr-03 $4,762,378 Nov-04 
26 $939,160 Sep-02 $987,148 Mar-04 
27 $2,903,621 Jan-02 $3,286,290 Oct-02 
28 $6,574,152 Jan-03 $6,816,536 Aug-04 
29 $14,673,685 Jan-02 $15,143,512 Apr-02 
30 $8,985,901 Feb-02 $9,402,495 Sep-03 
31 $4,941,777 Feb-02 $5,079,730 Mar-04 
32 $9,253,800 Sep-01 $9,653,974 Oct-03 
33 $1,991,282 May-02 $2,255,213 May-03 
34 $7,356,819 Dec-01 $7,524,512 Mar-04 
35 $7,068,780 Aug-02 $7,180,632 Feb-04 
36 $1,965,933 Apr-03 $2,056,406 May-04 
37 $8,018,263 Jun-02 $8,032,314 May-04 
38 $5,177,130 Sep-02 $5,343,481 Jan-04 
39 $7,719,027 Mar-02 $7,671,966 Jun-03 
40 $603,417 Dec-02 $603,417 Dec-03 
41 $3,654,101 Aug-02 $3,664,906 Jan-04 
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#  ACWE  ACWE DATE  CWE  
CWE 
DATE 
42 $3,871,358 Aug-01 $4,929,143 Jun-04 
43 $7,592,093 Feb-02 $7,547,768 Aug-03 
44 $10,738,330 Aug-02 $12,268,791 Mar-04 
45 $23,479,720 Jan-02 $24,377,941 May-03 
46 $31,557,177 Jul-01 $32,177,903 Feb-04 
47 $15,308,860 Jan-02 $16,575,804 Feb-04 
48 $5,570,689 Jun-02 $5,669,826 May-04 
49 $13,446,540 Apr-01 $13,387,295 May-03 
50 $4,657,350 Apr-02 $5,088,754 Jan-04 
51 $2,529,017 Mar-03 $2,627,832 Jul-04 
52 $5,769,876 Oct-01 $5,977,252 Mar-04 
53 $6,238,100 Feb-02 $6,428,355 Feb-04 
54 $6,665,731 Jan-03 $6,795,127 Jan-04 
55 $1,880,000 Feb-02 $1,894,370 Mar-04 
56 $2,137,880 Apr-03 $2,242,314 Mar-04 
57 $2,141,864 Jan-02 $2,162,291 May-03 
58 $1,746,138 Jan-02 $1,827,061 May-03 
59 $5,658,556 Jan-03 $5,854,658 Dec-03 
60 $3,532,820 Jan-02 $3,547,375 Aug-02 
61 $2,591,700 Dec-02 $2,655,639 Dec-03 
62 $5,698,441 Jun-01 $5,465,195 Nov-04 
63 $2,990,522 May-01 $3,054,058 Apr-04 
64 $1,059,691 Aug-02 $1,167,751 Oct-03 
65 $964,356 Feb-03 $973,073 Apr-04 
66 $1,588,340 Apr-03 $1,588,580 Jul-04 
67 $7,466,529 Apr-03 $7,915,780 Jan-05 
68 $2,366,637 Sep-03 $2,375,978 Aug-04 
69 $5,140,800 Mar-03 $4,805,692 Aug-04 
70 $1,393,200 Mar-03 $1,307,955 Jul-04 
71 $1,696,000 Mar-03 $1,783,760 Jan-04 
72 $2,555,275 Aug-03 $2,543,382 Nov-04 
73 $3,171,531 Dec-02 $3,131,860 Jun-03 
74 $8,003,073 Sep-02 $8,575,235 Aug-04 
75 $4,291,693 Mar-02 $4,233,648 Feb-03 
76 $6,142,565 Apr-01 $6,532,705 May-04 
77 $3,164,000 Jan-02 $3,200,425 Oct-03 
78 $6,150,000 Jun-02 $6,150,000 Jun-02 
79 $1,166,000 Sep-02 $1,250,800 Sep-03 
80 $4,387,157 Sep-02 $4,387,157 Sep-05 
81 $2,267,790 Jun-03 $2,246,620 Aug-04 
82 $3,745,338 Dec-01 $3,795,816 Aug-03 
83 $11,531,051 Feb-02 $12,119,742 Mar-04 




























# APPR FY EFD General Specific 
85 MNR   2003 S Housing BEQ 
86 MCON  2001 R Housing BEQ 
87 MCON  2002 S Housing BEQ 
88 MNR   2002 S Housing BEQ 
89 MCON  2002 R Housing BEQ 
90 MCON  2003 S Housing BEQ 
91 MCON  2002 L Housing BEQ 
92 MCON  2001 L Housing BEQ 
93 MCON  2001 L Housing BEQ 
94 MCON  2002 S Housing BEQ 
95 MCON  2002 L Housing BEQ 
96 MCON  2001 P Housing BEQ 
97 MCON  2001 L Housing BEQ 
98 MCON  2001 P Housing BEQ 
99 MCON  2002 R Housing BEQ 
100 MCON  2002 R Housing BEQ 
101 MCON  2001 R Housing BEQ 
102 MCON  2002 L Housing BEQ 
103 MCON  2003 R Housing BEQ 
104 MCON  2002 R Housing BEQ 
105 MCON  2002 R Housing BEQ 
106 MCON  2002 L Housing BEQ Modernization 
107 MCON  2002 P Housing BEQ Modernization 
108 MCON  2002 L Housing BEQ Replacement 
109 MCON  2002 S Housing BEQ Replacement 
110 MCON  2002 P Housing BEQ Replacement 
111 MCON  2004 S Housing Recruit Barracks 
112 MCON  2004 S Housing Recruit Barracks 
113 MCON  2001 S Housing Recruit Barracks 
114 MCON  2001 S Housing Recruit Barracks 
115 MCON  2002 S Housing Recruit Barracks 
116 MCON  2002 S Housing Recruit Barracks 
117 MCON  2002 L Housing Transient BEQ 
118 MCON  2002 R Housing Transient BEQ 
119 MCON  2001 L Maint Fac Aircraft Maint Fac 
120 MCON  2001 L Maint Fac Aircraft Maint Fac 
121 MCON  2002 L Maint Fac Aircraft Maint Fac 
122 MCON  2002 S Maint Fac Aircraft Maint Fac 
123 MCON  2002 R Maint Fac Aircraft Maint Fac 
124 MNR   2002 L Maint Fac Aircraft Maint Fac 
125 MNR   2002 S Maint Fac Aircraft Maint Fac 
126 MCON  2002 R Maint Fac Aircraft Maint Fac 
127 MCON  2001 S Maint Fac Aircraft Maint Fac 
128 MCON  2001 R Maint Fac Aircraft Maint Fac 
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129 MCON  2001 L Maint Fac Aircraft Maint Fac 
130 MCON  2003 R Maint Fac Aircraft Maint Fac 
131 MCON  2002 L Maint Fac Aircraft Maint Fac 
132 MCON  2001 L Maint Fac Aircraft Maint Fac 
133 MNR   2003 S Maint Fac Engine Maint Shop 
134 MNR   2002 S Maint Fac Maint Fac 
135 MCON  2001 S Maint Fac Maint Fac 
136 MCON  2001 S Maint Fac Maint Fac 
137 MCON  2001 S Maint Fac Maint Fac 
138 MCON  2001 L Maint Fac Maint Fac 
139 MCON  2001 R Maint Fac Maint Fac 
140 MCON  2003 R Maint Fac Maint Fac 
141 MCON  2001 R Maint Fac Maint Fac 
142 MCON  2002 R Maint Fac Maint Fac 
143 MNR   2003 S Maint Fac Maint Fac 
144 MCON  2001 L Maint Fac Maint Fac 
145 MCON  2002 R Maint Fac Maint Fac 
146 MCON  2003 R Maint Fac Maint Fac 
147 MCON  2001 L Maint Fac Ship Maint Fac 
148 MCON  2002 P Maint Fac Ship Maint Fac 
149 MCON  2002 R Maint Fac Ship Maint Fac 
150 MNR   2002 R Maint Fac Vehicle Maint Fac 
151 MNR   2002 S Maint Fac Vehicle Maint Fac 
152 MCON  2003 R Maint Fac Vehicle Maint Fac 
153 MNR   2003 S Maint Fac Vehicle Maint Fac 
154 MCON  2002 R Maint Fac Vehicle Maint Fac 
155 MNR   2001 S Ops Fac Air Passenger Trmnl 
156 MCON  2003 R Ops Fac Air Passenger Trmnl 
157 MCON  2002 R Ops Fac Instruction Facility 
158 MCON  2002 L Ops Fac Instruction Facility 
159 MNR   2002 S Ops Fac Marine Crps Rsrv Ctr 
160 MNR   2001 L Ops Fac Marine Crps Rsrv Ctr 
161 MCON  2001 P Ops Fac Operations Building 
162 MCON  2001 L Ops Fac Operations Building 
163 MNR   2002 L Ops Fac Operations Building 
164 MCON  2001 L Ops Fac Operations Building 
165 MCON  2002 S Ops Fac Operations Building 
166 MCON  2002 L Ops Fac Operations Building 
167 MCON  2001 R Ops Fac Operations Building 
168 MCON  2001 S Ops Fac Operations Building 
169 MCON  2002 S Ops Fac Operations Building 
170 MCON  2001 R Ops Fac Operations Building 
171 MCON  2002 L Ops Fac Operations Building 
172 MCON  2001 R Ops Fac Operations Building 
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173 MCON  2001 P Ops Fac Operations Building 
174 MCON  2002 P Ops Fac Operations Building 
175 MCON  2003 R Ops Fac Operations Tower 
176 MCON  2002 R Ops Fac Operations Tower 
177 MNR   2002 S Ops Fac Reserve Center 
178 MNR   2003 S Ops Fac Reserve Center 
179 MNR   2002 S Ops Fac Reserve Center 
180 MNR   2003 S Ops Fac Reserve Center 
181 MNR   2001 R Ops Fac Reserve Center 
182 MNR   2003 S Ops Fac Reserve Center 
183 MNR   2002 S Ops Fac Reserve Center 
184 MNR   2001 S Ops Fac Reserve Center 
185 MNR   2001 S Ops Fac Reserve Center 
186 MNR   2003 R Ops Fac Reserve Center 
187 MNR   2001 S Ops Fac Reserve Center 
188 MNR   2001 S Ops Fac Reserve Center 
189 MCON  2002 R Ops Fac Reserve Center 
190 MCON  2001 S Ops Fac Reserve Center 
191 MCON  2002 L Ops Fac Testing Lab 
192 MCON  2001 L Ops Fac Testing Lab 
193 MCON  2001 L Ops Fac Testing Lab 
194 MCON  2001 R Ops Fac Testing Lab 
195 MCON  2003 R Ops Fac Testing Lab 
196 MCON  2001 R Ops Fac Testing Lab 
197 MCON  2002 L Ops Fac Testing Lab 
198 MCON  2001 L Ops Fac Testing Lab 
199 MCON  2001 L Ops Fac Testing Lab 
200 MCON  2001 L Ops Fac Testing Lab 
201 MNR   2001 S Ops Fac Training Facility 
202 MCON  2001 R Ops Fac Training Facility 
203 MCON  2001 S Ops Fac Training Facility 
204 MNR   2001 S Ops Fac Training Facility 
205 MCON  2002 R Ops Fac Training Facility 
206 MCON  2001 R Ops Fac Training Facility 
207 MCON  2003 S Ops Fac Training Facility 
208 MCON  2001 R Ops Fac Training Facility 
209 MCON  2003 S Ops Fac Training Facility 
210 MCON  2002 R Ops Fac Training Facility 
211 MCON  2001 S Ops Fac Training Facility 
212 MCON  2001 R Ops Fac Training Facility 
213 MCON  2001 P Ops Fac Training Facility 
214 MCON  2001 S Piers Berthing Pier 
215 MCON  2001 R Piers Berthing Pier 
216 MCON  2001 R Piers Berthing Pier 
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217 MCON  2002 R Piers Berthing Pier 
218 MCON  2001 R Piers Pier Improvements 
219 MCON  2001 L Piers Pier Improvements 
220 MCON  2001 L Piers Pier Improvements 
221 MCON  2001 S Piers Pier Improvements 
222 MCON  2001 P Piers Pier Improvements 
223 MCON  2002 R Piers Pier Improvements 
224 MCON  2002 R Piers Pier Replacement 
225 MCON  2002 R Piers Pier Replacement 
226 MCON  2002 L Piers Pier Replacement 
227 MCON  2003 L Piers Pier Replacement 
228 MCON  2001 R Piers Pier Replacement 
229 MNR   2001 R Piers Seawall 
230 MNR   2001 S Prprty Ctrl Fac Armory 
231 MCON  2001 R Prprty Ctrl Fac Armory 
232 MCON  2003 L Prprty Ctrl Fac Armory 
233 MCON  2001 L Prprty Ctrl Fac Armory 
234 MNR   2003 S Prprty Ctrl Fac HAZMAT Storage 
235 MCON  2002 L Prprty Ctrl Fac Ordnance Facility 
236 MCON  2002 S Prprty Ctrl Fac Ordnance Facility 
237 MCON  2002 R Prprty Ctrl Fac Ordnance Facility 
238 MCON  2003 R Prprty Ctrl Fac Ordnance Facility 
239 MNR   2001 S Prprty Ctrl Fac Warehouse 
240 MCON  2001 S Prprty Ctrl Fac Warehouse 
241 MCON  2002 L Prprty Ctrl Fac Warehouse 
242 MCON  2004 L Prprty Ctrl Fac Warehouse 
243 MCON  2002 S Prprty Ctrl Fac Warehouse 
244 MNR   2002 S Prprty Ctrl Fac Warehouse 
245 MCON  2002 L Prprty Ctrl Fac Warehouse 
246 MCON  2001 L Prprty Ctrl Fac Warehouse 
247 MCON  2001 L Prprty Ctrl Fac Warehouse 
248 MCON  2001 L Prprty Ctrl Fac Warehouse 
249 MCON  2001 S Runway Prjct Aircraft Parking 
250 MCON  2003 R Runway Prjct Aircraft Parking 
251 MCON  2002 R Runway Prjct Aircraft Parking 
252 MCON  2001 S Runway Prjct Aircraft Parking 
253 MCON  2003 R Runway Prjct Aircraft Parking 
254 MCON  2001 R Runway Prjct Aircraft Parking 
255 MCON  2003 R Runway Prjct Aircraft Parking 
256 MCON  2001 L Runway Prjct Airfield Improvements 
257 MCON  2001 S Runway Prjct Airfield Improvements 
258 MCON  2001 L Runway Prjct Airfield Improvements 
259 MCON  2002 L Runway Prjct Airfield Improvements 
260 MCON  2001 L Runway Prjct Airfield Improvements 
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261 MCON  2003 S Runway Prjct Runway Lights 
262 MCON  2003 L Runway Prjct Runway Lights 
263 MCON  2002 S Runway Prjct Runway Lights 
264 MCON  2003 L Security AT/FP 
265 MCON  2003 S Security Gate Improvements 
266 MCON  2003 S Security Gate Improvements 
267 MCON  2003 S Security Gate Improvements 
268 MCON  2003 S Security Gate Improvements 
269 MNR   2003 S Security Security Fencing 
270 MCON  2003 R Security Security Fencing 
271 MCON  2003 R Security Security Fencing 
272 MCON  2003 R Security Security Lighting 
273 MCON  2003 R Security Security Lighting 
274 MCON  2003 P Security Security Lighting 
275 MCON  2001 R Security Security Support Fac 
276 MNR   2003 S Security Visitor Processing Ctr 
277 MCON  2003 L Security Visitor Processing Ctr 
278 MCON  2003 R Utilities Electrical Upgrades 
279 MCON  2002 R Utilities Electrical Upgrades 
280 MCON  2002 P Utilities Electrical Upgrades 
281 MCON  2002 L Utilities Electrical Upgrades 
282 MCON  2002 L Utilities Electrical Upgrades 
283 MCON  2002 R Utilities Sewage Trtmt Plant 
284 MCON  2001 P Utilities Sewer 
285 MCON  2002 P Utilities Sewer 
286 MCON  2002 P Utilities Shore Power 
287 MCON  2002 S Utilities Water Tank 
288 MCON  2002 R Utilities Wtr Trtmnt Fac Upgrd 
289 MCON  2001 R Utilities Wtr Trtmnt Fac Upgrd 
290 MCON  2002 P Utilities Wtr Trtmnt Fac Upgrd 
291 MNR   2002 S Base Amnty Bridge Replacement 
292 MCON  2001 R Base Amnty Child Development Ctr 
293 MCON  2001 L Base Amnty Child Development Ctr 
294 MCON  2002 S Base Amnty Child Development Ctr 
295 MNR   2001 S Base Amnty Church 
296 MCON  2002 L Base Amnty Cut/Fill Area 
297 MCON  2003 R Base Amnty Dental Clinic 
298 MCON  2002 S Base Amnty Fire Station 
299 MCON  2002 L Base Amnty Fire Station 
300 MCON  2002 S Base Amnty Fire Station 
301 MCON  2004 L Base Amnty Fitness Center 
302 MNR   2001 S Base Amnty Fitness Center 
303 MCON  2001 S Base Amnty Fitness Center 
304 MCON  2003 L Base Amnty Fitness Center 
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305 MCON  2001 R Base Amnty Fitness Center 
306 MCON  2001 L Base Amnty Fitness Center 
307 MCON  2002 R Base Amnty Fitness Center 
308 MCON  2001 S Base Amnty Fitness Center 
309 MCON  2002 R Base Amnty Galley 
310 MCON  2001 L Base Amnty Museum 
311 MNR   2001 S Base Amnty Recreational Facility 
312 MCON  2001 R Base Amnty Recreational Facility 
 
# PA ACWE CWE 
85 $6,730,000 $6,517,840 $6,531,576 
86 $8,260,000 $7,903,704 $8,076,009 
87 $8,914,000 $9,951,955 $9,928,229 
88 $8,958,000 $8,731,220 $8,848,541 
89 $9,903,000 $7,027,295 $7,089,910 
90 $10,460,000 $10,117,878 $10,473,155 
91 $13,405,000 $12,388,571 $12,521,744 
92 $14,300,000 $13,882,840 $13,807,468 
93 $16,100,000 $16,944,676 $17,574,948 
94 $16,244,000 $14,293,400 $14,448,842 
95 $16,353,000 $15,064,929 $15,250,260 
96 $16,500,000 $15,118,385 $15,395,943 
97 $17,197,000 $17,974,915 $19,196,503 
98 $18,400,000 $17,538,446 $18,013,592 
99 $20,973,000 $16,396,580 $16,377,837 
100 $21,369,000 $15,905,906 $16,152,018 
101 $21,770,000 $14,304,164 $15,270,182 
102 $22,388,000 $20,468,820 $19,990,598 
103 $25,354,000 $18,018,480 $18,798,391 
104 $29,357,000 $22,963,460 $22,900,495 
105 $46,734,000 $40,596,176 $39,850,856 
106 $14,572,000 $12,711,200 $13,681,711 
107 $23,050,000 $21,201,540 $22,634,958 
108 $9,705,000 $8,999,692 $9,260,560 
109 $14,147,000 $12,093,900 $12,340,480 
110 $17,115,000 $14,506,255 $15,991,697 
111 $31,600,000 $30,163,344 $30,852,225 
112 $34,130,000 $31,670,240 $31,540,022 
113 $37,000,000 $31,970,929 $33,154,658 
114 $37,700,000 $32,575,313 $33,734,665 
115 $40,690,000 $37,457,866 $38,419,048 
116 $40,690,000 $37,457,866 $38,652,334 
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117 $14,463,000 $13,045,000 $13,879,252 
118 $23,268,000 $18,066,400 $18,248,002 
119 $800,000 $700,000 $743,373 
120 $2,450,000 $2,587,054 $2,603,659 
121 $3,067,000 $3,106,879 $3,726,208 
122 $3,334,000 $3,578,952 $3,619,004 
123 $3,433,000 $3,332,192 $3,759,712 
124 $3,673,000 $3,264,217 $3,654,898 
125 $3,702,000 $2,192,716 $3,418,523 
126 $4,422,000 $3,192,640 $3,395,795 
127 $4,700,000 $4,434,054 $4,304,358 
128 $6,280,000 $6,794,570 $7,593,989 
129 $8,480,000 $7,130,511 $7,669,775 
130 $9,031,000 $8,468,225 $8,709,202 
131 $11,179,000 $12,137,540 $12,669,151 
132 $11,800,000 $11,297,328 $13,375,043 
133 $1,500,000 $1,475,649 $1,497,718 
134 $643,000 $536,360 $545,847 
135 $1,230,000 $1,169,840 $1,226,693 
136 $2,420,000 $2,650,485 $2,661,762 
137 $3,900,000 $4,555,000 $4,586,983 
138 $4,150,000 $3,900,225 $4,367,778 
139 $4,340,000 $2,768,088 $3,034,310 
140 $5,451,000 $9,262,280 $4,758,072 
141 $6,660,000 $6,089,844 $6,217,659 
142 $6,747,000 $5,720,284 $6,412,806 
143 $8,850,000 $4,580,595 $4,867,843 
144 $9,500,000 $9,199,766 $9,566,649 
145 $13,019,000 $10,024,282 $10,050,049 
146 $5,805,000 $5,409,272 $5,710,389 
147 $3,100,000 $2,922,406 $3,086,135 
148 $7,815,000 $4,855,617 $5,129,103 
149 $11,852,000 $7,841,101 $10,170,933 
150 $989,000 $939,160 $987,148 
151 $1,473,000 $1,505,904 $1,823,112 
152 $3,497,000 $2,915,000 $2,934,995 
153 $4,140,000 $2,549,978 $2,641,663 
154 $5,303,000 $2,903,621 $3,286,138 
155 $590,000 $1,262,425 $717,313 
156 $7,940,000 $6,574,152 $6,742,469 
157 $9,754,000 $8,985,901 $9,402,495 
158 $15,126,000 $14,673,685 $14,918,929 
159 $5,141,000 $4,941,777 $5,086,830 
160 $9,100,000 $9,253,800 $9,653,974 
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161 $2,100,000 $2,125,059 $2,295,391 
162 $2,100,000 $1,991,282 $2,264,667 
163 $2,106,000 $1,361,473 $1,441,179 
164 $2,830,000 $3,762,543 $3,772,661 
165 $4,630,000 $4,512,840 $4,647,347 
166 $5,045,000 $4,290,350 $4,675,424 
167 $5,280,000 $5,457,087 $5,603,263 
168 $6,950,000 $5,695,400 $5,908,280 
169 $7,281,000 $7,068,780 $7,174,284 
170 $8,860,000 $7,356,819 $7,523,947 
171 $8,993,000 $7,932,200 $8,129,706 
172 $11,400,000 $12,205,900 $12,677,870 
173 $35,600,000 $33,985,864 $37,526,022 
174 $37,178,000 $33,011,586 $36,669,877 
175 $2,191,000 $1,965,933 $2,054,067 
176 $6,678,000 $8,018,263 $8,030,552 
177 $2,946,000 $2,510,342 $2,653,519 
178 $1,040,000 $350,995 $860,115 
179 $1,048,000 $1,137,960 $1,146,931 
180 $1,240,000 $768,868 $740,468 
181 $1,420,000 $1,144,195 $1,227,341 
182 $1,450,000 $1,230,170 $1,230,170 
183 $4,376,000 $5,177,130 $5,352,426 
184 $4,730,000 $4,504,762 $4,993,898 
185 $5,200,000 $4,950,000 $4,295,954 
186 $5,905,000 $4,029,000 $4,065,289 
187 $7,000,000 $7,166,400 $7,276,059 
188 $7,080,000 $6,688,121 $7,263,661 
189 $8,666,000 $7,719,027 $7,667,987 
190 $11,700,000 $12,379,243 $14,491,899 
191 $2,236,000 $2,260,000 $2,315,456 
192 $3,300,000 $3,773,433 $3,951,631 
193 $6,570,000 $6,253,945 $6,728,340 
194 $9,400,000 $11,060,526 $10,956,800 
195 $10,061,000 $9,998,856 $9,995,765 
196 $10,200,000 $10,296,000 $10,833,062 
197 $10,655,000 $12,362,500 $12,523,587 
198 $10,680,000 $7,567,888 $7,790,558 
199 $11,300,000 $10,524,000 $10,970,294 
200 $12,390,000 $13,245,225 $13,644,000 
201 $1,769,000 $1,661,532 $1,742,314 
202 $2,100,000 $1,708,002 $1,917,225 
203 $2,660,000 $3,074,906 $3,221,474 
204 $3,570,000 $4,053,000 $4,185,714 
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205 $3,740,000 $3,654,101 $3,663,649 
206 $4,000,000 $3,871,358 $4,924,541 
207 $4,981,000 $4,753,840 $4,867,440 
208 $5,500,000 $4,832,541 $4,937,453 
209 $7,290,000 $7,406,222 $7,547,463 
210 $8,518,000 $7,592,093 $7,548,188 
211 $9,960,000 $7,667,760 $8,019,150 
212 $10,000,000 $9,474,706 $11,411,937 
213 $14,200,000 $15,285,483 $16,166,481 
214 $3,570,000 $4,186,000 $4,114,555 
215 $12,800,000 $10,213,725 $11,077,498 
216 $35,700,000 $31,557,177 $32,177,553 
217 $17,313,000 $15,308,860 $16,575,804 
218 $1,400,000 $1,196,640 $1,102,992 
219 $4,700,000 $4,550,813 $5,804,495 
220 $4,960,000 $4,798,850 $5,418,646 
221 $6,830,000 $6,112,000 $6,379,402 
222 $12,000,000 $13,202,460 $13,881,353 
223 $12,267,000 $10,738,330 $12,267,536 
224 $13,583,000 $12,190,000 $15,384,326 
225 $24,198,000 $23,479,720 $24,352,623 
226 $27,908,000 $28,479,679 $29,038,470 
227 $32,979,000 $31,923,809 $32,185,265 
228 $38,000,000 $35,279,000 $38,436,903 
229 $950,000 $887,095 $902,476 
230 $3,490,000 $2,899,089 $2,996,237 
231 $4,100,000 $3,882,013 $4,053,059 
232 $4,166,000 $4,657,350 $5,172,042 
233 $14,000,000 $13,446,540 $13,282,708 
234 $2,690,000 $2,529,017 $2,627,832 
235 $5,817,000 $5,769,876 $5,977,252 
236 $5,758,000 $5,570,689 $5,661,288 
237 $7,083,000 $6,238,100 $6,425,395 
238 $7,221,000 $6,665,731 $6,788,891 
239 $800,000 $782,880 $774,059 
240 $1,100,000 $1,252,835 $1,240,808 
241 $1,543,000 $1,746,138 $1,827,061 
242 $1,550,000 $1,245,178 $1,252,650 
243 $1,939,000 $1,880,000 $1,894,374 
244 $2,244,000 $2,137,880 $2,232,600 
245 $2,463,000 $2,141,864 $2,162,291 
246 $3,650,000 $3,507,120 $3,583,351 
247 $6,430,000 $6,634,000 $6,913,825 
248 $7,400,000 $8,504,690 $9,245,520 
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249 $2,670,000 $1,558,434 $1,581,016 
250 $2,952,000 $2,591,700 $2,655,639 
251 $3,868,000 $3,532,820 $3,544,490 
252 $4,850,000 $4,462,000 $4,659,826 
253 $6,651,000 $3,637,698 $4,304,616 
254 $8,200,000 $7,934,100 $8,171,333 
255 $8,313,000 $5,658,556 $5,851,946 
256 $1,670,000 $1,211,614 $1,233,555 
257 $3,140,000 $2,990,522 $3,054,058 
258 $5,250,000 $5,443,000 $5,536,851 
259 $6,292,000 $5,698,441 $5,465,195 
260 $6,350,000 $5,787,565 $6,247,793 
261 $974,000 $964,356 $973,073 
262 $1,967,000 $1,211,815 $1,257,785 
263 $2,117,000 $1,039,402 $1,167,751 
264 $11,412,000 $10,673,480 $10,741,955 
265 $1,574,000 $1,588,340 $1,583,580 
266 $1,883,000 $1,739,108 $1,760,677 
267 $2,192,000 $2,014,357 $2,075,371 
268 $2,670,000 $2,439,852 $2,595,472 
269 $1,510,000 $1,350,223 $1,505,025 
270 $2,012,000 $2,366,637 $2,375,479 
271 $8,368,000 $7,466,529 $7,902,805 
272 $7,073,000 $5,140,800 $4,805,116 
273 $1,574,000 $1,393,200 $1,306,898 
274 $4,184,000 $2,054,372 $2,219,497 
275 $4,600,000 $3,975,189 $4,592,324 
276 $1,500,000 $1,696,000 $1,765,559 
277 $2,680,000 $2,555,275 $2,585,068 
278 $3,473,000 $3,171,531 $3,131,249 
279 $3,858,000 $4,291,693 $4,199,919 
280 $11,970,000 $8,003,073 $8,577,837 
281 $12,762,000 $9,875,100 $9,598,768 
282 $15,453,000 $14,754,000 $16,719,585 
283 $1,550,000 $1,550,000 $1,261,027 
284 $6,900,000 $6,142,565 $6,532,705 
285 $16,719,000 $11,238,511 $11,590,561 
286 $5,936,000 $3,164,000 $3,197,937 
287 $3,858,000 $3,021,800 $3,082,070 
288 $6,084,000 $6,150,000 $6,150,000 
289 $6,600,000 $5,255,000 $7,006,270 
290 $13,949,000 $12,313,858 $12,923,500 
291 $1,285,000 $1,166,000 $1,250,800 
292 $3,790,000 $3,436,742 $4,331,969 
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293 $4,420,000 $4,083,940 $4,125,143 
294 $5,995,000 $5,718,880 $5,896,405 
295 $1,830,000 $1,511,173 $1,284,421 
296 $4,400,000 $4,387,157 $4,387,157 
297 $2,380,000 $2,267,790 $2,243,780 
298 $3,660,000 $4,325,232 $4,512,426 
299 $3,749,000 $3,745,338 $3,816,535 
300 $5,372,000 $5,500,004 $5,853,514 
301 $1,970,000 $1,773,427 $1,757,435 
302 $2,650,000 $2,643,380 $2,598,610 
303 $2,950,000 $3,272,081 $3,137,979 
304 $5,284,000 $4,240,326 $4,458,575 
305 $6,390,000 $3,454,147 $4,456,034 
306 $8,590,000 $9,781,000 $9,980,336 
307 $13,316,000 $11,531,051 $12,114,273 
308 $35,000,000 $32,673,000 $33,402,646 
309 $11,802,000 $9,749,880 $10,456,904 
310 $2,450,000 $2,439,065 $3,021,857 
311 $1,670,000 $1,411,040 $1,489,942 









Appendix C:  Current Technology Available Through the TRACES 
Website 
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 Micro Computer Assisted 
Cost Engineering System 
(MII) 
Formerly called MCACES.  MII is a detailed cost estimating 
module based upon labor rates, equipment rates, crews, material 
pricing information, productivity rates and markups maintained 
by the USACE with assistance from Project Time & Cost, Inc. 
Historical Cost Analysis 
Generator (HII) 
Formerly called HAG.  HII is a collection of historical costs for 
awarded MILCON projects.  The program allows the tri-
services to forecast the cost of future construction needs. The 
system is maintained by Project Time & Cost, Inc. 




Used for preparing programming estimates for MILCON 
projects.  Created by the USAF in conjunction with EarthTech. 
SuccessEstimatorTM SuccessEstimatorTM is a cost estimating program maintained 
by the Navy in conjunction with U.S. Cost.  The program 
includes Parametric Cost Estimating Models (PCEM) and a 
Unit Price Book (UPB). 
Life Cycle Costing 
(LCC) System 
Assists in the estimates of costs for the lifecycle of the facility 
CostRisk Contingency calculator maintained by the USACE 
PC Cost Budgetary estimating module 
Guidance Unit Costs 
(GUC) 
Provides costs for various facilities based per unit (size, 
quantity). 
Size Adjustment Factors Aids in more accurate cost estimates for varying sizes of 
facilities based off historical data. 






108th Congress. Public Law 108-324:  Military Construction Appropriations Act and 
Emergency Hurricane Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2005. October 13, 2004.  
URL: http://www.fsa.usda.gov/dam/bud/AppropAction/FY2005/PL108-
324October132004.pdf, date accessed:  May 7, 2005. 
 
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation. Virginia: Implementation of Norfolk Naval 
Station Hangars Master Plan.  Updated: 6 June 2002, Paragraph 7. URL: 
http://www.achp.gov/casearchive/casessum01VA.html, date accessed January 31, 
2005.  
 
Berrigan, Beth LTC. Fiscal Law Aspects of Ethics. 1996. U.S. Department of the Navy 
Ethics Compass. URL: http://ethics.navy.mil/ethics/training/fiscallaw.ppt, date 
accessed: January 31, 2005. 
 
Crow, Dwin Charles. Affect of Contractor’s Estimating System Deficiencies and 
Disapprovals on DoD Procuring Contracting Officers (PCO), 1996. URL:  
http://library.nps.navy.mil/uhtbin/cgisirsi/WmuBmDWQUh/SIRSI/75360054/9, 
date accessed:  April 6, 2005. 
 
Defense Acquisition University. Military Construction, Navy (MILCON): Cost Element 
Estimating Guide. Tab 14, Paragraph 8. URL: http://akss.dau.mil/docs/ca0d14.rtf, 
date accessed: February 29, 2005. 
 
Department of Defense. DoD Instruction Number 7700.18. July 16, 2003, page 9. URL: 
https://134.11.61.26/CD9/Publications/DoD/I/I%207700.18%2020030716.pdf, 
date accessed: March 20, 2005. 
 
Else, Daniel H. Appropriations for FY2002: Military Construction. URL: 
http://www.radanovich.house.gov/documents/FY02milconAppropsCRSReport.pd
f, date accessed: March 4, 2005. 
 
Oberlender, Garold D. (2000). Project Management for Engineering and Construction, 
Second Edition, Boston.  
 
Project Time & Cost, Inc. Tri-Services Automated Cost Engineering Systems (TRACES). 
2004. Project Time & Cost, Inc. URL: http://www.ptcinc.com/contract_traces.asp, 
date accessed: March 30, 2005. 
 
R&K Engineering.2005. R&K Engineering Website. URL: 
http://www.rkeng.com/index.asp, date accessed: January 31, 2005. 
 107
U.S. Constitution. Article 1, Section 9, Clause 7. URL: 
http://www.house.gov/Constitution/Constitution.html, date accessed: March 30, 
2005. 
 
U.S. Cost. NAVFAC Cost Engineering Policy and Procedures. 16 November 2001. U.S. 
Cost Website. URL: 
http://www.uscost.net/CostEngineering/Documents/NAVFAC%20milhandbook%
201010b/NAVFAC1010b.htm, date accessed: March 30, 2005. 
 
U.S. House of Representatives. Title 31, U.S. Code, §1301, §1341, §1517. Office of the 
Law Revision Counsel. URL: http://uscode.house.gov/lawrevisioncounsel.php, 
date accessed: March 30, 2005. 
 






Lauren Ashley McMillan was born in Phoenix, Arizona on May 1, 1979, the daughter of 
Joan Carol Jacobson and Steven Douglas Jacobson.  She attended Moon Valley High 
School in Phoenix for one semester before moving to Sheridan, Wyoming where she 
attended Sheridan High School.  Upon completion of high school, in 1997, she entered 
the United States Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland.  She received the degree of 
Bachelor of Science in Mathematics in May, 2001 along with her commission in the 
United States Navy Civil Engineer Corps.  During the following years she served one 
tour at Naval Air Station Jacksonville, Florida at the Public Works Center as the 
Assistant Production Officer.  In January 2004, she entered The Graduate School at 
University of Texas.   
 
Permanent Address:  673 South Thurmond 
    Sheridan, Wyoming 82801 
 
This thesis was typed by the author. 
 
 
 109
